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Educational Theory....

BUSINESS CIVILIZATION AND THE FAMILY

HAROLD ORDWAY RUGG, 1886–1960

HYPOTHETICAL THINKING IN EDUCATION

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Educational Theory

Volume X July, 1960 Number 3

BUSINESS CIVILIZATION AND THE FAMILY. PART I

BY JACK OTIS

Introduction

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FOCI TO THIS STUDY WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO SPECIALISTS IN EDUCATION, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES. The first is to convey an idea of the controlling principle in the affairs of western culture since the proposals of educators and others for reconstructing education, the promulgations of social scientists in such areas as the prevention of juvenile delinquency and adult criminality, the reform of the economic order, and the improvement of family life, to name a few, frequently rest upon a faulty or incomplete and unclear understanding of the life reality about them. Sociology, for example, if we may generalize about so diverse and scattered a field, has largely structured its knowledge edifice upon a philosophical base of crude naturalism and naive empiricism, and as a result seems presently to be lost in a maze of causal analyses about anything which may catch its eye. Mistaken assumptions[1] have led sociology, and the social sciences as a whole, to become social psychology and to overlook, or to connect with accidentally and peripherally, the proper object of its study: the institutional order.

[1]Current sociological theory makes three crucial assumptions: (1) Society is a natural fact on the same order as the materials of the natural scientist, and as a result can be analyzed in causal terms. Indeed, to be *scientific* is synonymous with a causal interpretation of the material studied. (2) Values can not be logically validated since their status is psychological rather than objective. Values are the opinions and attitudes of individuals and groups. (3) Society is best understood by isolating and studying its elements. The element chosen may be the individual, a social group, the family, the juvenile delinquent, the recidivist, the dope addict, etc. Once having isolated some element for study the point is to plumb its depths. These mistaken assumptions may be designated as (1) the causal fallacy, (2) the empiricist fallacy, and (3) the nominalist and reductionist fallacies.

This situation has arisen from the failure of social theory rather than from a deliberate moral failure to take responsibility for providing insight into important life problems, and this theoretical failure we believe to be the more adequate explanation for the busy work of so many contemporary social scientists. One can scarcely doubt the sincerity of sociologists as they so dedicatedly describe individuals singly and in groups, and provide us with a colorful report of their wants, needs, and attitudinal states of mind about anything and everything. Nevertheless, we can not overlook the difficulty which confronts those interested in developing knowledge about society, since far from their serving as a source of enlightenment, the social sciences seem largely to confound[2] the minds of men about issues relevant to life problems. But such understanding we must have since without it the educational efforts and the more formal action programs of educators, economists, marriage and family specialists, criminologists, and others may miss the mark. To obtain this we will turn, of necessity, to the work of a philosopher and artist. We recognize, of course, that there is also much confusion in philosophy and aesthetics, but the position we take implicitly since to defend it would take us beyond the scope of this study, is that both philosophy and art have been more prolific and more fruitful in providing man with cultural insight.

A second focus of the study is the relation of art to reality. Through a close study of Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman* this point should become manifest, that true art relates the individual to reality rather than aids his escape from it. It does not accomplish this function intellectively but through the medium of feeling. The tragic, comic, sublime, grotesque, beautiful qualities of the work of art substantiate themselves in the feelings of the individual, and in this way he becomes sensitized to the dimension of reality characterized (qualitatively depicted) by the aesthetic object. The artist's assertion, or more strongly, creation of reality may be viewed in two ways:

1. Objects are significant constituents of reality, and are all to one degree or another aesthetic since any object may be characterized in terms of color, tone, line, form, design, etc. Whether the object is interpreted as ugly, sublime, comic, grotesque, tragic, or beautiful, or some other, the interpretation is being made in terms of aesthetic categories. The artist attempts to make the object perfection itself; the artist is the creator of reality in its most perfect form. High forms of art, as contrasted with the vulgar and works of sheer craftsmanship, go beyond the attempt to achieve either popularity or even mere internal perfection *qua* object to a conceptualization of the world. In the painter's depiction of the adoration of the Christ child we feel the significance and creative promise of human birth; in the sculptor's portrayal of the old prostitute, the lack of value in so much of life. Through art we are sensitized to a dimension of reality which we never

[2] "The Proper Study of Mankind," *The* (London) *Times Literary Supplement*, No. 2,946, August 15, 1958 is a concise and perceptive statement of the current status of sociology, and by implication the social sciences as a whole. A similar, but more expanded statement in this vein is that of Pitirim A Sorokin, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956). The organized confusion of sociology is neatly, if unintentionally, summed up in a recent letter from a sociologist: "I do not know what you mean by 'contemporary sociology'—the term does not have a simple referent. The methods, theoretical schemes, perspectives, and value orientations in current sociological literature are so diverse that the phrase contemporary sociology does not mean very much to me."

felt before, or of which we had only a lurking awareness, and as a result our feelings and activities to a minor or major extent undergo alteration. For business reasons advertising exploits this fact to the hilt in all the media of communication. But if art is the *via affective* to reality, commercial "art" is a perversion of the genuine through its deliberate misconstruction of life realities in the interest of manipulation. However, in both cases art emotively conceptualizes the world for man.

2. Experience in the individual or "shared" sense is held to be the only reality known. Granting for the moment this empirical presupposition, on this basis it may still be logically defensible to hold that artists create reality through creating the objects which are content for experience. Such objects contain no ordinary content of experience since they result in the individual's having what Dewey calls *an* experience. The same point would hold even if the argument were put in terms of "shared" experiences, experiences shared with the artist or with a group about the object of art, since the aesthetic object is the focus of or structure for experience.

The second postion, however, results in the problem of epistemology and the "egocentric predicament;" how do we break out of our presumed knowledge of experience only to knowledge of the objective world? The positivist and semanticist heirs of empiricism have responded by contemptuously denying the existence of metaphysical problems and by verbal jugglery reminiscent of scholasticism. Nevertheless, if reality is equated with individual or group experiences, no matter how these experiences get hedged in by "method" and "prediction," not only art but science comes to inquiet rest upon subjective foundations. Far from our experiences, individual or group, defining the reality and worth of objects, it is quite the other way around: it is through having knowledge of objects that the value and significance of our experience is defined. Thought has objects as content, and not experience in any important sense since the latter is notoriously unreliable and unstable. Such knowledge as we have is through adequately and systematically conceptualizing or categorizing some object of study, viz. physical and/or chemical categories for the structure of material objects, biological categories for the life processes of organisms, aesthetic categories for art objects, sociological categories for the instituted life of man, etc. Experience, then, is not some ultimate given fact, a "Ding an sich," but is constructed and reconstructed through the development of the categories necessary for the understanding of objects. Objects in their relations provide the stability and structure upon which thought erects its knowledge edifice and whose assertion is language and art; the realities of life and our knowledge of them are the metaphysical bases for the felt qualities of experience. It is for this reason that *experience may more adequately be understood as a derived psychological fact whose quality changes with changes in the world and our knowledge of the latter.*

We will therefore rest our analysis upon the assumption made in number one above, that the work of art is an emotive but concrete assertion of reality. As such it must be interpreted in terms of its own real qualities, qualities which cannot be viewed in any way desired since the aesthetic object is a reality on its own hook just as a molecule, virus, and astral constellation are for knowledge purposes. Like any object of science, the aesthetic object requires logical definition, and it is this attempt which underlies the analysis of *Death of a Salesman.*

A basic question we are raising may then be formulated in either of two ways: (1) What is the reality that the play conceptualizes in qualitative form? or (2) What should the quality of our experience be when we read or view the play?

A third focus of this study is the implicit argument for the use of art as an important tool of pedagogy. The sophisticated expression of this view may be traced to Plato whose psychological theory held that feeling was a primordial and significant component of mind to be rationally ordered. The rational ordering of feeling required an aesthetic education for the young and an aesthetically ordered state for the citizenry as a whole. Hence "music" in the school, harmony in society, beauty in the city-state, all were indispensable in the education of citizens, for they were literally the good, black soil of feeling formation in which the active and intellective aspects, the greenery and flowering of personality and mind, were securely and healthily rooted in an organic unity. The following analysis by James K. Feibleman is a needed reminder of the basis in feeling for much that we think and do.

> Most people do not do any more abstract thinking than is absolutely necessary for their simple needs; but each of us feels, if not equally profoundly, and everyone engages in action. Unconscious beliefs are contained as consequences more clearly in feelings and actions than they are in the expression of conscious thoughts. So it is at the level of feeling and action that we readily find the phenomenon of the implicit, dominant ontology. A man may assert one belief and, under the pressure of crisis, act in the spirit of another. When we act from feeling, we act from the springs of unconscious belief. Our beliefs, so to speak, betray themselves in feelings and actions, but they never appear candidly as what they are, and their axiomatic nature is well concealed.[3]

Our assumption about art in its function for pedagogical purposes is that whatever it does it does through gripping the feelings of the learner, in principle similar to the way that the aesthetic order of a culture precipitates in the feelings of the citizenry. For example, it is the *objective* panoply of pomp and circumstance of the feudal nobility which precipitates in feelings of lordly arrogance and "natural" superiority, and arouses complementary feelings of awestruck obeisance and inferiority on the part of the disadvantaged classes. In this sense, the aesthetic organization of life is ultimately a political problem. From a pedagogical point of view the problem is the appropriate selection and presentation of aesthetic objects in terms of the level of student development so that the feelings of students are more finely formed and/or brought to full consciousness for further study, analysis, and reintegration. In connection with the latter Feibleman says,

> The proper kind of education, then, must consist in the eliciting of contradictions in the matter of unconsciously held beliefs, to demonstrate elements of untenability in the implicit, dominant ontology. Only when this has been done have we prepared a student for the ready reception of material furnished by the agreement between logic and fact. For to convince him that he holds contradictions is to render his present beliefs untenable and thus to put him in the way of examining others along with them.[4]

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[3]James K. Feibleman, "An Ontological Philosophy of Education," in *Modern Philosophies and Education*, 54th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 346–347.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 348.

Our suggestion is that the deliberate use of aesthetic content may serve educational purposes through forming attitudes, or by dredging up the emotive commitments of the student for exposure to critical appraisal. Both functions are related ones, and which predominates will depend upon the level of maturity of the learner. At all levels, but especially for the very young, aesthetic materials seem crucial in forming the unconscious set of the mind, and in older students and adults these materials are the means *par excellence* for reaching their deepest levels of feeling. The gods and devils of most men come to them through the colors and tones of affect, e.g., during World War II our posters, movies, and other aesthetic media depicted the Jap-gorilla and the feelings of the citizenry responded appropriately.

While the general importance of aesthetic materials as a pedagogical tool seems clear, such materials may have particular significance for subject matter areas with which they are not ordinarily related. For example, in the social studies the merely intellectual (statistical and factual) consideration of such problems as poverty, slum housing, corruption in government, etc. frequently fails to grip the student. It may be that when the feelings are sensitized through art and allied with adequate knowledge that we attain the mental or personality foundation for the socially sensitive action we expect of students in their capacity as citizens.

But is art taught to excite the feelings of students in relation to rational ideas of the public life in which we move and breathe? As Kenneth Burke has urged with respect to the analysis of the details of the drama:

> And we do this, not just to learn something about the given work, but ultimately in the hope of learning something about the ways in which the "personality" of the work relates to the "personality" of a social order; . . . we look for ways whereby the work embodies, however assertively, even militantly, the *malaise* of a given property structure (with the goads, and "mortifications," and demands upon our "patience," and invitations to victimage, that are intrinsic to any such order).[5]

The student, of course, in programs of "aesthetic education" should be helped to appreciate the formal elements of the art object, but also the relevance it may have as a conceptualization of the public problems of men. It is this latter failure (or avoidance?) which by default helps leave the student with merely his ego or self-interest as the object of his feelings, and consequently of his "problem-solving" activities. This lack of relatedness between our knowledge of the world and our feelings toward it may constitute a fatal flaw in the make-up of the minds of students as well as of the citizenry. In this vein Archibald MacLeish points out:

> For this divorce between knowing and feeling did not first appear in September of 1958, and neither is it anything we Americans can claim as our own peculiar prerogative. The Germans have exhibited the same curious capacity: the "good Germans" who "knew" about the gas ovens of the concentration camps, but were nevertheless able to live in tranquility and good conscience, until they began to go, in crowded silent audiences, to performances of "The Diary of Anne Frank." And we ourselves—shall we call ourselves the "good Americans?"—are guilty of the same peace of mind. We "know" what happened at Hiroshima. But do we feel our knowledge? Could we even think about risking the possibility of a world-wide atomic war as a matter of "face" or official vanity if we did?

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[5]Kenneth Burke, "Linguistic Approach to the Problems of Education," in *Modern Philosophies and Education, op. cit.*, p. 275.

> . . . knowledge without feeling is not knowledge and can lead only to public irresponsibility and indifference—and conceivably to ruin . . . when the fact is disassociated from the feel of the fact in the minds of an entire people—in the common mind of a civilization—that people, that civilization is in danger.
>
> Whatever the underlying cause of the divorce of feeling from knowing, that divorce reveals itself most vividly in the strange and ignorant belief that the life of imagination lies at an opposite pole from the life of the inquiring mind—that men can live and know and master their experience of this darkling earth by accumulating information and no more.
>
> To me—not many others think so—the real crisis in the life of our society is the crisis of the life of the imagination. Far more than we need an intercontinental missile or a moral rearmament or a religious revival, we need to come alive again, to recover the virility of the imagination on which all earlier civilizations have been based: Coleridge's "synthetic and magical power" by which "the whole soul of man" may be brought to activity, and knowledge may be known.[6]

For the generality of learners might the more adequate and widespread use of aesthetic materials be at least as significant as the proliferation of mental health personnel in the building of integrated, effective personalities? The whole man is one who not only knows, but feels the commitments defined through reason, such that action must follow.

The practical import of exposure to art and analysis of its content as a pedagogical technique inheres in art's imaginative forming of feeling. Through art the world is transformed from external abstraction to internalized meaning, and it is in this fleshing out of the dry bones of intellect with the strength of feeling that impetus is provided for the achievement of ends. If this is the case, art is as important for the rational, public purposes of education as it has been in the past for the sanctification of the church and now is for the manipulative interests of business. The requirement enjoined upon educators is that of choosing works of art at appropriate pedagogical levels which are a synthesis of aesthetically defensible elements and logically defensible ideas.

A fourth focus of this study is the detailed delineation through the analysis of *Death of Salesman* of how truth is attained from an aesthetic object. Obviously the method used by the artist is not one of presenting facts literally, abstractly, or quantitatively as in the social scientist's painful and labored efforts to build up his generalizations. The method is one of using significant symbols to present a universal meaning: in this father-son misunderstanding, the eternal anguish of Father-Son misunderstandings; in the inability of the teacher to support his family, the profound indictment of a political-economic system. In this particular we have the medium through which to feel the universal. Through art we grasp the *qualitative* meaning of our world.

The logic of aesthetic method is to so order details in their qualitative relations to one another that a whole of meaning is conveyed. But the logic of science is the same when it achieves its abstract universals, that is, science studies natural materials in their external and/or internal relations so that the principle (the abstract universal or law of the relations) may be known. To understand this

[6]Archibald MacLeish, in a lecture delivered at the University of Minnesota, excerpts reprinted in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (January 25, 1959), p. 5C.

plant is to understand the principles of plant life; to comprehend this organism is to comprehend the principles of organismic life. Whereas the natural sciences advance our understanding of the physical or material world, art advances our understanding of the cultural world of man. And this leads to our concluding emphasis.

The final focus of this study is to suggest the principle criterion for categorizing a work of art, and that is through an understanding of its Idea. What is the idea, and does it more or less adequately categorize cultural reality? This is not to overlook the import of the elements of the aesthetic object, in this case language, plot line, characterization, structure, auditory and visual appeal, etc. Nevertheless, their careful appraisal we leave to aesthetic technicians with the suggestion that even the most scrupulous technical-historical-biographical critique fails importantly unless it comprehends the relation of the elements to the idea. In the mature work of art the idea principles the elements, and every element implies the idea. An idea without the adequate structuring of elements may convey a "message" but is not of aesthetic significance; and technically competent elements without a significant idea characterize the best of commercial art, and also the decorations now titillating the aesthetic "purist." The point made by Archibald MacLeish about the poem we hold to be true of all art:

> Great poems are instruments of knowledge—knowledge carried alive into the heart by passion, but knowledge nevertheless. Feeling without knowing never made a work of art and never will.[7]

The categorization of a work of art in terms of its idea is dependent upon the philosophic wisdom of the critic. What does the cultural life of man mean? What is the value and significance of human life? What constitutes human nature? What are its legitimate aspirations? The critic's answer to these questions will determine his general approach to an aesthetic object. We will not tackle these questions directly due to their obvious difficulty and scope; for our purpose it will be sufficient to state our view of that which negates a life of meaning and value for man—business—since *Death of a Salesman* is the delineation of life unrealized.

BUSINESS AS INTEREST

The term *business* is an ambiguous one since it is used in a variety of ways some of which lack clarity or are contradictory to other usages. One generic use of the term is to designate a characteristic activity of man, e.g. the business of the doctor is the prevention, alleviation, and cure of human illness, the business of the architect is the designing of structures and cities, the business of the child is play, etc. According to this usage all civilizations may be referred to as business civilizations since all require the performance of a variety of activities by men, but this loses the distinctive character of business. Another use of the concept is when it is identified with capitalism, that is a business or capitalist society is said to be characterized by the efficient use of advanced technology as the basis of the economic order. However, fascist, communist, and socialist states may make effective use of and advance the technology and capital equipment of the economy.

[7] *Ibid.*

That something more is involved is indicated by the businessman's rejection in principle, even if qualified by the necessities of practice, of any form of authority which would substitute governmental control and planning or even the moral authority of religion over economic practices. For the businessman any type of control or measure that undermines the primacy of the principle of private return would by definition signify totalitarianism, and what is really troublesome, the kind with which he cannot do business. Then the real meaning of technology for the "capitalist" or business mind is that its development can more rapidly and securely advance private profit and power. Business may also be identified with competition. However, other systems use monetary and titular awards as competitive devices to encourage economic as well as other forms of achievement. More importantly, individual and corporate competition is perhaps only a stage in business development. First, for the sake of greater, more assured profits economic competition of itself leads to the elimination of competition and the development of monopoly power; secondly, when economic units become large scale corporate enterprises competition is too damaging for all concerned and is therefore deliberately attenuated. Even a casual glance at the economy reveals its basically cooperative nature both within and between industries. The essence of modern technology is such that men and industries work together in highly organized fashion to provide economic goods and services.

If the crucial aspect of the business idea is not some characteristic activity of man, nor the widespread and efficient use of technology to achieve economic goals, nor competition in economic relations, what then is it? Our argument, baldly stated, is that the key idea of business is that of being in business for oneself—"private enterprise." The business idea is one of work activities primarily directed toward the individual's own advantage. It is private gain which counts rather than the attainment of culturally significant goals. Other values may be achieved but they are incidental to or accidents of the business orientation.

That the individual works for himself is the great myth of business ideology. Work is of "social" or public significance and always has been. Moreover, men not only work collaboratively but in contemporary life they work with an extraordinary degree of integration in the achievement of public goals. However, this commonplace fact is disguised by the individually structured system of financial rewards as well as the ethic that men acquire from the business milieu that they are to pursue their own interests as the *summum bonum* upon which all other goods rest. In short, business is interest in the minds of men and the organization of society. It is this which explains why business is most threatened by any institutional or ideational development which directly or indirectly attacks the organization of economic and cultural affairs upon an interest basis.

To say that the business mind is the interest mind calls for some clarification of the concept of interest. Stated simply, according to Jordan whose analysis we follow here,[8] the term "interest" is not to be equated with such terms as purpose, objective, end or goal since *the latter involve states of affairs whose factual meaning is the ground for the mental processes and activities of the individual.* In this sense the individual may be viewed as "other directed," but the other is not

[8]Elijah Jordan, *The Good Life*, Chicago: (The University of Chicago Press, 1949). See the discussion of interest pp. 221–226 and 131–141.

a person or group of persons who steer him but some situation of fact, such as a slum condition which stimulates thought and action. It is the slum and its consequences for life which is the concrete basis of the attitude taken by the individual. Then purposes, objectives, ends, or goals are those constructive orientations toward the culture which, viewed psychologically, are present as dispositions in the individual, and when viewed objectively, refer to some state of fact which requires action in order to improve its quality. The real meaning of interest, however, resides in its reference to the advantage in terms of profit or power of some particular without consideration of facts and their meaning in the world. The objectively grounded, disinterested justification is absent. Whoever has an *interest* in an object, whether the individual, group, or nation, is claiming some special advantage for himself. Jordan illustrates this point as follows:

> I may be interested in a clean city because I dread typhus for myself or family, or because my interest will make me prominent or lead to my election as councilman, or merely because people will praise or like or approve of me. Whether these are all proper or worthy is not here the question. But they represent the correct use of the term. An interest is a subjective inclination toward, and concern for objects which complement the interest with an advantage for the person who feels the interest. My interests all imply and express advantage to me. And it is unnecessary confusion to speak of common or public interests. No meaning can be made of a blunt contradiction There are no public interests. And it is equally absurd to speak of a number of people having a "common interest" in a thing when we mean that they all expect to gain some advantage from it. Interest implies advantage, and advantage means getting something that other people do not have. A common interest is a contradiction in terms. My "interest", that is, my subjective inclination toward, and concern for, a clean city, is a public purpose and not an interest at all, if it is genuine. It is an interest if I expect advantage to myself as different and distinct in any way or degree from the advantage of anybody else. Where I expect and anticipate this advantage, I am interested; where I am not concerned about advantage, but about objects as such, I have a purpose. And all genuine purposes are public purposes; the distinction from interest being the presence in the latter of a sense of advantage.[9]

While the concept of interest has been and is currently used to convey several meanings not all of which are consistent, Jordan's usage will be followed throughout this paper as conducive to greater clarity of thought about the acts of men and how meaning is attributed to those acts. The interested "act" has its meaning to some particular which isolates itself from its system of relations in order to gain a private advantage, while the cultural act, the act embodying purpose, has its reference to and derives its meaning and integrity from the maintenance and development of the institutional world. It is with this purist definition of interest in mind that it may be said unequivocally that the interested act and an act that is cultural are antithetical to one another, or that where they may conjoin, as at times they do, it is pure accident.

In its major meaning American civilization may be viewed as an interest civilization *par excellence*. At the same time it is essential to recognize that there is also present within it the corporate dedication to ends as can be observed in men devoted to knowledge, health, family life, honest government, a fine religion, and the like, for without this sound element of the cultural the interest parasite itself could not survive. Nor need one overlook the fact that every conceivable

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

form of interest point of view may be found, but the one that has come to be dominant is an expression of classical individualism, the philosophic justification of the individual's primacy in economic and political affairs. The pursuit of self-advantage as the natural right of the individual is the core idea of the business system and has, through the business control of the economy, achieved enormous influence in modern life.

Despite its long history business has always been a relatively minor element in culture until recent times. Its present position of dominance[10] connects with the accidents of history which permitted it to fasten itself upon the burgeoning economic life from whose growth it gained enormous power and with which it has tended to be identified. Unfortunately, modern thought has for the most part, Veblen and socialist thinkers excepted, failed to clearly distinguish business from industry, a confusion ardently abetted and compounded by business propaganda itself. However, as Jordan points out,[11] industry is intelligently organized work to the end of creating the physical values or objects fundamental to the realization of every human objective. Production and distribution as integrally related to this primary function of industry are, when rational, adjusted to the attainment of the manifold public ends of life. On the other hand business, dedicated solely to the protection and enhancement of private advantage, profit and power and the control of the whole human enterprise in its own interest, is the "system of blind control"[12] fastened upon the industrial process. Business is therefore not a form of intelligence internal to the industrial order guiding it in the attainment of its end, but an external force or mechanism hindering its normal functioning.

Like all genuine cultural institutions industry is natural, constructively connecting as it does with the system of physical nature. Both business and industry affect the thoughts and actions of man, but it is only the latter which is based upon necessities inherent in the structure of nature. Nature is the material by virtue of which the development of tools and organized work efforts is necessitated as a rational enterprise if values are to be attained in the world as concrete elements of it. Business makes no such rational connection and in this sense is unnatural. Industry as a typic form of action realizes itself in a characteristic object, but business has no act peculiar or appropriate to itself, and therefore achieves no object of cultural value either in the sense of a tool or an end.[13] "An interest

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[10]While it is not our task to make intelligible the rise of business, Jordan in scattered portions of his writings seems to account for it as a resultant of the breakdown of medieval society. Spiritual religion had emphasized the inner dignity of man due to his possession of an immortal and ineffable soul, but with direction from the church gone all man had left was the felt qualities of his experience. Out of this metaphysic individualism arose, and the interest idea in its lowest, crudest form: "organismic interest." Professor Erich A. Ahrens of the University of Illinois has suggested, in several unpublished papers, notably those on "War" and "Capitalism," that the business mind developed also as a reaction to feudal society on the part of its victims. Instead of following the interests of the lord, to be free, to even have the status of a man, meant following *one's own interests and no other.* Not the despotic feudal lord, but the interest of the individual alone determined the true, the good, the beautiful.

[11]See Chapter XVII, "Industry as Organized Work," in *The Good Life.*

[12]Elijah Jordan, *Business Be Damned,* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1952), p. 33.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 59.

never refers to an object, but refers an object to a subject; hence cannot be realized."[14] From this equation of business with interest it follows that business is incapable of action since it has no organic relation to objects; having no relation to objective ends, it is the apotheosis of aimlessness. As a consequence, possessing no "policy" but advantage, it is incapable of real vision or action with respect to domestic or international affairs,[15] currently instanced by its concern with but inability to counter the growing world-wide Russian economic challenge, since to do so would mean to give up its interest control of the economy in favor of public policy. Instead its typic "policy" is one of reaction, of pure make-shift, of acting constructively under duress or as a component part of military strategy, of, in short, pathetically stumbling from one near disaster to another. As intrinsically incapable of action in the constructive, goal achieving meaning of the term, its native tendency is to weaken and destroy the cultural endeavors with which it makes contact.

Representing the motives of profit, acquisition, advantage, control in its own interest, it is for this reason that business is an endless psychological process having no objectives and thus incapable of realizing any.

> Business is, properly speaking, a purely subjective phenomenon. It is a system of *mere states of mind*, not a system of modes of thought.[16]

There is a significant difference to be derived from Jordan's distinction of "modes of thought" from "states of mind." The former refers to those thought processes of men which make rational connection with the natural-cultural world of men and issue in activities maintaining and building of the world such as work, aesthetic appreciation and creation, reverence, play life, etc. Like modes of thought states of mind are also psychological processes, but *mere* psychological processes since they make no *rational* connection with the nature-culture world, although to be sure, they influence the activities of men in the world. The point of distinction is that a mode of thought is grounded in or justified by a system of relations external to the psychological processes of the individual into which it enters constructively. Medical science is a mode of thought; witchcraft is a state of mind. Medical science manifests itself in activities maintaining of human life through its logical comprehension of natural processes; witchcraft manifests itself in activities unrelated to or destructive of human life through its failure to rationally comprehend natural processes. The former is capable of growth, continuity and permanence in the sytem of human institutions, whereas the latter is self-contradictory in the sense that it must give way to more rational procedures, or if it grows, it will weaken and deteriorate the life of the society upon which it depends for existence. In either case a state of mind tends by its very nature to be self-negating. Then for Jordan to evaluate business as a state of mind is to damn its existence and to directly imply that it must and will give way, or the social order which it has infested must ultimately collapse.

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[15] Gunther Stein's book, *The World the Dollar Built*, (London: D. Dobson, 1952), is a development of this thesis.

[16] *Business Be Damned*, p. 56.

As suggested above in the witchcraft example, while a state of mind has little or no objective ground to justify it, it nevertheless exerts influence upon the activities of men and materializes itself in the customs and practices of men. Although we refer to business as a state of mind which interprets the world in terms of advantage, profit, and power, this interpretation has materialized itself in a faulty system of relations among the objects upon which the life of action depends.[17] *It is this materialization of the interest motive which objectively constitutes business and which gives it reproductive power through the system of habits and relations which it sets up among people and things.* It is not merely the subjective feeling of interest, the "love of money" that is wrong, but more profoundly, "It is this system of relations, as objectively constituting business, that is wrong."[18] The evil is not merely in the man, but in the *world*. Business, like war, while false to the life of action in every respect, has materialized itself in the world where it exerts real influence.

The problem of explaining the origin of business is a significant one for historical scholarship, but of no great practical consequence for this discussion. What is significant today is that men are born into a business *world*, that is the relations of persons and objects are so organized that in the ordinary course of growing up men unconsciously absorb the interest point of view. For example, the goods and services of life available to the family are dependent upon the economic return acquired by the individual, therefore I must struggle to get ahead financially. The salesman's interest in his commission and the mere making of a sale which so often pit him against the consumer are reflections of how his work is organized in fact. The property system is itself legalized around the notion of individual ownership and gain with the resulting fiction that property is "private", exclusive, and independent of considerations of the public weal, so that individual is pitted against individual, corporation against corporation, and the public welfare take the hindmost. The property system, our laws, the legislative process itself are all structured along interest lines, and it is this objective structure which our cultural life has taken that is the key fact of business society to be understood and reconstructed. Business is a hard fact structuring the action life of man, and it is this hard fact of societal organization that needs change along with changing the mind states of men. The term "business" will therefore be used in two related ways, depending upon context: First, and primarily, as the organization of institutional structures along interest lines. Second, and derivatively, as the attitudes and psychological disposition of individuals and groups.

Business, as interest materialized in the marrow of culture, in the institutions of society, exists as a special type of *relation* to culture through which it is known. The relation which is constitutive of the business mind is that special view of things which defines them solely in terms of private advantage and power. Business, as a concrete force in life, is therefore not restricted to the economic realm but exists as a type of mind in every life endeavor. Any thinking in terms of private advantage, profit, power, etc., *no matter what the field of endeavor*, represents the business mind in action. Doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, etc. may in reality be businessmen, and men in primarily economic fields of endeavor

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

[18] *Ibid.*

may not be; the latter may be industrialists. The point is that the business mind does not inhere in the character of the individual, man as man deserves better than that, but in the type of relation to life which has been built into it and which man has unwittingly incorporated into his character. Then to say the business mind is dominant today is to say this relation dominates cultural activities. Therefore, in harshly criticizing business, Jordan is directing his attack at a type of relation organized into life. The businessman himself is an object of pity since he is usually ignorant of the anticultural form his life has taken.

According to Jordan, the major motive of business used to be profit. Now its primary orientation is to retain and extend its dominance[19] over the cultural enterprise, a dominance for which it will even sacrifice profit as in contributions to the church, health activities, philanthropic enterprises, educational institutions, etc., in order that business control be maintained. Contributions are speedily raised on the open or veiled threat, depending upon the relative denseness of the business contributor, that "otherwise government will step in."

Like the feudal organization of life business develops a class system, but its major bases of prestige and control are economic and psychological rather than hereditary and military, although whenever needed it does not hesitate to use the military to maintain its power. Its characteristic implements in effecting and maintaining its position are psychological force and fraud.

> Instead of the kind of subjective fraud which business formerly made in misrepresenting the qualities and relations of objects, it now resorts to subjective force in compelling people to feel its interests whether they are conscious of it or not. Playing upon the unconscious drives in the interest of selling a product is a use of force just as much as if the user holds up his victim with a gun, or squeezes him in a merger.[20]

Its use of psychological force as its primary instrument through which it effects itself in life has made it a far greater threat to culture than physical coercion. When open violence is used, it may be readily perceived and its negative effect upon life easily understood. But business works covertly, transforming the ideational-affective side of man's nature so that no meaning or value is seen in life unless there is something in it for him. This is its value. The emotional life becomes extremely narrow since the individual s own self becomes its center; this narrowing may account for the extraordinary success of popular music whose appeal is to romantic gratification or suffering. Furthermore, business is concerned only with the quantitative aspects of feeling since its qualitative dimension involves the use of intelligence in the discrimination of objects to which feeling will attach. All business wants is sufficient intensity[21] of feeling to move men to its advantage.

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[19]Businessmen are unabashedly vocal and self-righteous about their need to protect and further their own interests, most often expressed at gloomily prophetic banquet speeches warning of the twin devils of growing government and labor power. Ironically, they fail to see that the labor leader is just another businessman, but from the other side of the tracks. The following two studies are revealing of the business surge toward power: Robert A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), and C. Wright Mill, *The Power Elite*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). Beginning with page 306 of the latter work there is the noting of the significant taking over by the businessman of the governmental commissions designed to regulate business.

[20]Jordan, *op. cit.*, pp. 173–174.

[21]*Ibid.*, pp. 172–174.

The use of sex in the sale of every conceivable object, of brutality to grip the attention of children in movie and television, of the most refined feelings involved in family love and the meaning of Christ's life as gimmicks in the profitable operations known as Mother's Day, Father's Day, and Christmas are cases in point. For business no feeling is too sacred to be turned to advantage, and as a consequence of this rather than as a deliberate intent business undermines the character of man through its careless coarsening of his sensibilities toward the objects and objectives of life about him.

That business will stop at nothing *it can get away with* (the business code of morality) was instanced in the Edward R. Murrow radio exposure of the use of call girls by business firms in order "to swing deals and make sales", and through which a non-too-subtle blackmail could be exercised over the married recipients of such favors. Some firms were not abashed about listing this as a legitimate business expense, and attempted to deduct call girl expenses from their income tax returns according to an Internal Revenue Service spokesman. But "show girls" at Las Vegas and other cities, as well as office staff, have been used to entertain prospects for some time, a use of womanhood it has pleased us to attribute only to Communist party members. Doubtless such practices are relatively small in number, but the logic of the interest mind is neatly exemplified here in its striving for self-advantage and power regardless of the means utilized or the objective consequences.

Business is the regulative principle of the western world, which is one with saying that to a minor or major extent all the institutions of the West have suffered from its corrosive influence. Concomitantly, the professions which presumably profess specialized public values as the concrete ends of thought and action have become corrupted through the deliberate or unwitting adoption of the business view of life.[22] Not only does professional integrity become enfeebled, but the structural defects it precipitates in the objective order precipitate also in the personality formation of the citizenry as a whole. In the world as organized by business every man to some extent becomes a businessman. The all pervading business atmosphere makes the child a businessman before the organized efforts of the church and school reach him to help make him otherwise, but all too often the career of profit and power they hold up to him as his "opportunity." Where the man yet has integrity the business machine slowly crushes it out of him since the financial return upon which his very life depends is held tightly in its grip. Whether given over to business unconsciously or with conscious reluctance, *to the extent to which business takes over the character of the man his life fails of cultural accomplishment.* In flat contradication to the businessman's boasts, in the world dominated by business the life of the individual fails of realization. It is the life without purpose, without objectives, the life dedicated to interest, and so incapable of realization. In a business civilization men live on the horns of a dilemma: to develop a sense of values through relations with elements of worth still present in the culture leads to their continual frustration by the organized motives of profit and power, and to adjust and develop a business mind means the abortion of the life of the individual as a cultural being.

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[22] *Business Be Damned* is the generalized development of this point. Jordan's deep concern over the professions taking on the business orientation and structure is largely responsible for the emotive and linguistic excesses to be found in this book. Nevertheless it should not be overlooked that this insight has a logical ground, a ground which is developed in the whole of Jordan's work.

FOCUS ON THE FAMILY

A study of the contemporary family reveals in a peculiarly suitable way the quality life has in the large, for its quality partakes of the civilization of which it is a part. As Jordan says,

> It has, that is, an eccentric organization, where the order of the old family was incentric. What the family is . . . is controlled largely by the institutional facts and forces that environ or circumstance it.[23]

In this vein it has become a truism of other than purely psychological studies of the family to note that its traditional functions have been lost.[24] Such traditional home functions as the raising and preparation of food, the manufacture of clothes, home construction, childbirth and the care of the sick, recreation and lesiure, education and the training in a vocation, and many more, have been largely or entirely taken over by public organs. We are not saying that this is inherently an evil, but simply that if this is a fair statement of the case, then it seems reasonable to assume that as the public life goes, so goes the family, not in every detail of course, but in its major essentials.

Moreover, as Jordan points out,[25] the family is essentially a reproductive institution, reproducing the organisms through which the species life is assured continuity, but the reproduction of the species life which the family insures is not only biological but cultural. It endeavors to turn out not only physically but morally capable individuals who, through the give and take possible in the protective milieu of the family, learn how to control the objects and persons of the environment in order to effect purposes. In the process the child becomes disciplined, not self-disciplined in its negative meaning of *restraint* of subjective impulses, but in the learning "of how to adapt the forces and circumstances of his environment to each other in such a way as will offer greater promise of, and opportunity for, action."[26] Then the moral obligation of parents is to know the relative worth of objectives accessible to the child. The parents must be competent people fully capable through possessing the knowledge and having access to the means with which the child may make his beginning acquaintance with the truth, beauty, and goodness present in the world. The family is the first institution through which the child makes contact with culture.

The obligation of parents to know is peculiarly accentuated in contemporary life since

> The family is the point where the educational, social, political, legal, industrial, and religious institutional relations and connections of life all meet. Not only do they meet in the family but the family is the point where what there may be of difference of direction, etc., among these institutions and their trends must be brought to some degree of unity. The motives of education and industry, which frequently run at

(*Continued on page 216*)

[23] *The Good Life*, p. 285.

[24] See Chapter 10 of Lawrence K. Frank's *Society as the Patient*, (New Brunswick: New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1948).

[25] *The Good Life*, Chapter XVI, "The Family as Organized Instinct."

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

Harold Ordway Rugg, 1886-1960

I

HAROLD RUGG: A MEMOIR

On May 17, at his home in Woodstock, New York, death came to Harold Ordway Rugg, one of the most famous and influential educational pioneers of our time.

It has been said that Rugg was at the forefront of more significant educational movements than any other man of this century. It is certainly true that he was versatile and talented in many directions and that he contributed significantly to almost every aspect of education. He began his career at the University of Chicago in the more precise study of education, writing one of the first books in educational statistics. During the First World War he served as a member of the Army Commission on Classification of Personnel. In this capacity he did extensive work in test development including man-to-man rating scales.

From measurement and statistics Rugg turned to the social studies curriculum in an effort to develop a comprehensive program of social education. In this work, he created the analytic technique of content selection associated with the expression "frontier thinkers," and made one of the first experimental tests of instructional materials prior to their use in the public schools. As a part of this project, he wrote a twelve volume series of social pamphlets which were subsequently expanded into his famous and influential fourteen volume series of high school texts, published under the title *Man and His Changing Society*. The notion that changes in teaching are most likely to occur if new ideas are built into instructional materials is, I believe, original with Rugg. He used to say emphatically, do not expect the teacher to change without materials; she cannot work without tools.

In 1920, Rugg left Chicago to become a professor at Teachers College, a position he was to hold until his retirement in 1951. In his early days at Teachers College he came under the influence of Dewey and Kilpatrick whose ideas stood in marked contrast to the scientific atmosphere of the Department of Education at Chicago. Although there was much in these new ideas which he found congenial, he could not go along with the notion of a curriculum made on the spot. Neither could he accept the particular conception of creativity which he found in Kilpatrick's thought, nor what he believed to be an over emphasis in Dewey upon the intellectual elements of experience to the exclusion of the aesthetic. His concern for the creativity of the individual, for his aesthetic development, and for his social education, was, I believe, the primary motivation for Rugg's role in the progressive education movement. For almost three decades he was a major spokesman for this movement throughout the world. His book *The Child-Centered School* was one of the earliest formulations of the conceptual bases of progressive education.

Turning his attention to the social bases of education in the early days of the great depression, Rugg joined with a small number of professors at Teachers

College to explore education from a social standpoint. Out of this group emerged the foundation courses in education. Rugg edited the two-volume set of readings used in these courses, a work which stimulated the development of courses in the social foundations of education in teacher training institutions throughout the country. During this period he wrote *The Great Technology*, in which he set forth the scientific revolution of the times and its meaning for the work of educating the young.

It was during the 20's that Rugg became interested in aesthetics and the creative act, an interest which was to dominate his thought for the remainder of his life. Among educators, he was one of the first to explore aesthetics in education and to raise the act of creativity to the level of an intellectual problem. On the day of his untimely death he had been engaged in the task of finishing what was to be his major work on the creative act.

Harold Rugg was born of New England parentage and brought up in the stringent environment of the New England of his day. He had gone to Dartmouth where he made an enviable record. After his bachelor's work he turned to engineering and was granted the degree of civil engineering from the Thayer School of Engineering. He taught Engineering at Millikin University, Decatur, Illinois, and from there he moved—with the hearty approval of the Millikin president, so he was fond of saying—to the University of Illinois where he taught in the College of Engineering. It was while he was at Illinois that he became interested in Education. There he completed the work for the doctor's degree under the guidance of William Chandler Bagley who was later to become Rugg's colleague at Teachers College.

I first saw Harold Rugg in the fall of 1931 at Teachers College in a class in which a number of professors lectured in turn. When his time came to speak, his first words were blurred by a slight stammer from which he quickly recovered, his subsequent speech turning out to be almost eloquent. He often stammered when he first began to speak, as though his thoughts trampled over his words. His movements were quick and his facial expression alert and decisive. It was not easy to disagree with Rugg as he spoke. He once said that no one can do anything half-heartedly. Perhaps he was thinking of himself, for it is certain that he could do nothing without giving himself entirely to the task. Blessed with perennial enthusiasm and with the energy to sustain it, he never went half way on anything. He could listen as intensively as he spoke; in conference, he always took copious notes from which he could reconstruct the entire discussion at any point. New ideas always captured his attention regardless of the source from which they came. But he did say on one occasion that it is from the young that new ideas most often come, and it is a fact that in his later years he often sought out young people with whom to discuss the problems of education.

Rugg cherished the value of time. Perhaps this regard for time was a residue from his New England upbringing. He once remarked that in thirty years at Teachers College he had never been late to class. I attended many committee meetings and had many appointments with him. He was never late; he was impatient with tardiness. He would look at his watch and twist about in his chair when anyone was late at a meeting. I think he associated tardiness with lack of interest. He was equally punctual in meeting his writing commitments.

He met all deadlines promptly. I heard him say that, on one occasion when his social studies books were being published, his writing kept barely a page ahead of the typesetter, so determined was he to meet his deadline.

A sense of the greatness and the mission of his country was deeply ingrained in Harold Rugg. I once ventured the idea that perhaps the historic role our country is destined to play is to spread European culture, and especially that of England, throughout the world just as Alexander's empire had done for ancient Greece. I had suggested this idea for the purpose of exploration. But Rugg was unwilling to entertain it even for discussion. Instead, he began immediately to oppose the notion by citing the creative role of the United States. He began with the presidency, pointing out the uniqueness of this office and the contribution which the American conception of the presidency had made toward ridding mankind of the domination of ruling classes. The public school, he went on to say, was a social invention of equal importance, uprooting the privileged classes and opening the doors of opportunity to everyone alike. Although he was keenly aware of the defects of our society, Rugg thought the open society—a society in which men would at last understand—was the ideal toward which America was moving and would continue to move. When his social studies books were attacked, by those he called evil little men, he neither ran for cover nor compromised. Perhaps it was his faith in the fundamental institutions of our country no less than his personal courage which sustained him as he met designed and unjust attacks upon his works.

When I think of Harold Rugg's profound optimism, the intensity of his mental work, and of his need for unceasing activity, I am inclined to believe that he died as he would have chosen to do—suddenly and without warning after a morning of productive work.

B. OTHANEL SMITH
University of Illinois

II

WORKING COLLEAGUE AND PERSONAL FRIEND

It was my privilege to know Harold Rugg intimately through many years—as working colleague and personal friend, and as genial host in his delightful home among the Woodstock hills he so dearly loved. He was singularly intense about everything he did; he seemed never to be casual about anything. He "toiled terribly" with his mind, and "played" with the spontaneity and zest of a school boy. The harder he drove himself in his study and literary workshop, the lighter was his heart during the intervals given to social intercourse or recreation.

Harold had a fast-working and exceedingly versatile mind. He was at home with engineers, statisticians, political scientists, and artists, as well as with educational psychologists and curriculum experts. I think he was happiest in the artist's world, for it was in the creative arts that he found the touchstone of reality. Fitting, indeed, was it that his last working hours, on a typical working day, were given to putting finishing touches on a climactic literary product.

With all his versatility, Harold limited his concern with the areas of learning in which he felt no urge to operate. I well remember his reaction to a friendly letter from a classical student criticizing his conduct of a basic course, a letter bristling with Latinity. "Mr. Blank," Harold asked in his most genial manner, "how are you in mathematics?" "Never studied mathematics" was the instant reply. "Good," exclaimed Harold, "I'm going to write *you* a letter!"

He had boundless optimism, without the slightest Pollyanna touch. His social faith rested on a grand conception of human potential. He was thoroughly realistic about the evil in contemporary society, but he trusted the *people* if only they were, as Woodrow Wilson put it, "fully informed and free to act." All his teaching and writing was directed toward informing people and making them free.

Harold Rugg's life and work point up a paradox with respect to social change and the role of education in promoting and guiding it. He believed in personal freedom, in social mobility, in institutional flexibility, and in the democratic process. He took these principles seriously and in reactionary circles earned the reputation of being a social rebel. But the sanctions he appealed to—and here the paradox appears—lie deep in the American ethos. They are the very opposite of "subversion." It was a grotesque illusion that the Rugg textbooks so widely adopted in American schools were mischievously radical and "un-American." Their author yielded to none in his antipathy to the Communist philosophy. But he knew that a political system cradled in liberty is in perpetual danger of losing its heritage. How preposterous that champions of the Bill of Rights should be the first objects of attack by those who profess a jealous guardianship of the "Ark of the Covenant!"

As in politics, so in education, "the best traditions make the best rebels." It is doubtful if any American educator working at the classroom level has done more than Harold Rugg to make the best of our traditions live in the minds and hearts of youth.

F. ERNEST JOHNSON
Professor Emeritus, Teachers College,
Columbia University

III

HAROLD RUGG AND THE NEW EDUCATION

Shortly after I went to Winnetka, Illinois, as Superintendent of Schools in 1919, the principal of one of the schools came to me and said, "I am taking a course in statistics under a young professor at the University of Chicago. He's wonderful! He has energy, enthusiasm, and vision. He inspires us. You must come to his class with me some evening and get to know him." I accepted the invitation. Thus began forty-one years of close association with Harold Rugg, and a great friendship.

Harold came into education by a strange route. Trained as a civil engineer, he became absorbed in statistics and their use in the measurement of education—

the decade just prior to 1920 was one of intense activity in the scientific approach to education in the United States and Rugg's first book, *Statistical Methods Applied to Education* (1917), was used all over the country.

In 1920 he joined the faculty of Teachers College of Columbia University where he remained until his retirement. It was in his first years (1921–28) that he issued his epoch making series of *Social Science Pamphlets*. These transformed the teaching of "social studies" throughout the United States, integrating history, geography, economics, and civics into a composite whole closely related to current problems.

It was in 1927 that he had his first contact with the New Education Fellowship, when he attended the international conference in Locarno. The effect was electrical. I remember his saying to me there, "Carleton, this is something great! We must become a part of the movement!" A year later he and Ann Shumaker published *The Child Centered School*. Thenceforward he was in the forefront of the progressive education movement in the United States. And at the Nice conference of the NEF (1932) he and I, representing the Board of Directors of the Progressive Education Association, working with Beatrice Ensor, Lauren Zilliacus and others representing the NEF, helped bring about the affiliation of the Progressive Education Association with the New Education Fellowship as its United States Section.

From then on, at one international conference of the Fellowship after another, he was one of the key speakers, always lifting the minds and spirits of the audience to new heights, always giving world-wide perspective to educational issues.

During the last several years of his life the seed planted in Locarno that first sprouted in *The Child Centered School*, was coming to full growth and fruition in the book that was to be his magnum opus—a book on the creative act. That book, based on years of wide reading and intensive research and thinking, was almost completed at the time of his death. It is hoped that it may be posthumously published. In it Harold's wisdom and vision will be made available to countless persons who have not had the great opportunity so many of us have had of being warmed and enlightened by personal contact with him.

Such contact was had last winter by the people of many nations at the New Education Fellowship conference in New Delhi. There, with his remarkable wholeheartedness and vigor, he took a leading part in the meetings of the executive committee and on the program. It was a fitting climax of his career.

His whole life was well characterized by those words of his student in 1919: "He's wonderful! He has energy, enthusiasm, and vision. He inspires us!"

CARELTON WASHBURNE
Brooklyn College

IV

MEMORIES OF A LOST LEADER

Perhaps the last bit of writing published by Harold Rugg before his death was a tribute in the December, 1959, issue of *The New Era* to the long-time leader of The New Education Fellowship, the late Laurin Zilliacus. Some of the moving words of that tribute to his friend could just as well apply to Harold Rugg himself:

"He was ever world-minded, his concepts reaching far beyond national boundaries, petty quarrels, little loyalties. . . . But he could be tough-minded when the situation demanded. He never flinched from ugly realities and he had the courage to speak out and the skill to speak eloquently in the face of bullying power. . . . He wrote with the candor and courage he showed in his speeches."

No wonder that Harold Rugg admired so kindred a spirit.

I have many cherished memories of our lost leader, only two or three of which can be shared here. In the late 1940's, it was he more than any other who spurred me on to the completion of my largest work, he who edited it painstakingly, he who buoyed me up and reassured me when others were drifting away from the orientation in educational philosophy which a few of us were trying to explicate and defend in the face of unsympathetic if not hostile currents in the American climate of the '40's and '50's.

Indeed, if any one personal impression of Harold Rugg remains central, it is his steadfastness. Never, in the face of bitter, nationwide attacks upon his own books and lectures, or in the years following, did he waver in his support of a clear, future-pointing, culture-centered theory of education. If anything, his convictions grew in strength, for they were increasingly supported by widening bodies of research in the behavioral sciences, some of which he knew and used intimately, others of which he constantly urged younger men to incorporate in their own work.

In this sensitivity to new developments, Harold Rugg was something of a genius. Though he remained far ahead of his time up to his death, he often detected trends before the rest of us did and he tried to encourage those he could reach to explore and apply them in practice. It was this kind of insight that led to his unique influence through the series of social-studies textbooks for junior high schools, to his college volumes in the foundations of education, and near the close of his life to a stubborn effort to bring the interdisciplinary revolution in the sciences of man closer to the mainstream of educational theory.

Many who read this will never forget his last appearance before the Philosophy of Education Society in April, 1960. The deep, still youthful earnestness with which he sought to introduce his listeners to a complex vista of frontier studies concerning the esthetic imagination was a stirring and dramatic event. It will remain enshrined in his posthumous book—the culminating struggle of a lifetime to transform education into a great creative adventure.

THEODORE BRAMELD
Boston University

HYPOTHETICAL THINKING IN EDUCATION

BY GEORGE S. MACCIA

THE RUDE AWAKENING BROUGHT ABOUT BY RECENT ADVANCES IN RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY HAS BROUGHT ON A FLOOD OF CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES ABOUT THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAN SCHOOLS. It has been said often that schools are developing a 'group-mindedness' among our youth which depreciates individual excellence and effort. As a remedy some are calling for a return to hard 'facts' and the so-called mind-sharpening disciplines of mathematics and science. Against the sound and fury of current controversies, I suggest that the solution to the problem for education in democracy does not lie in the reemphasis of certain specific subject contents severly taught. Furthermore, it lies only partially in social adjustment. It lies, rather, in the development of the quality of thinking on the part of individual students.

Whether shaping satellites or democracy, individuals who think creatively and build co-operatively are necessary. Creative thinking employs both analysis and synthesis. Analysis and synthesis form part of the activities in which students are engaged in our nation's schools. In our classrooms experience is examined, distinctions are noted, categories are proposed, concepts are formed, concepts are related, and re-formed. Yet, creative thinking, unfortunately, is not emphasized in any great measure either in current educational practices or in current proposals for improvement. Certainly, individual differences in physiological equipment, cultural backgrounds, and in motivation do account in part for the small measure of creative thinking achieved in our schools. One might argue, indeed, as many do, that only a few are gifted. Nevertheless, I aver that there is a mind-set in much of our current methodology which shackles thought.

In our current methodology we have come to prize two notions about formal education both of which have been shaped to operate within a machinery of mass production. On the one hand we assert the primacy of subjects rooted in traditions of classical literature which we call the Humanities. On the other hand we assert the primacy of subjects rooted in traditions of naive empiricism which we call the Sciences. In the Humanities we dish out the gems of the past in order to preserve our heritage and to provide models for 'liberal' thinking. In the Sciences the most abstract conceptions are forced into ill-fitting models of actual experience in order to support the contention that experience teaches. Such methods, unfortunately, assure that meanings are confined to what is said to be actual e.g., the descriptions of the writings of yesterdays creative thinkers and the quantitative relating of particular events. In both cases we cripple our youth by building around them a wall of actual experience too high for them to see what lies beyond. The creative man must re-make his experience. He must leap the wall and explore the region of the possible.

The thesis of this paper is that thinking analytically at any level of human discourse involves not only thinking in terms of what is actual, but also thinking-

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ing in terms of experience which is not actual. In other words, thinking in terms of possibles is equally involved and is of utmost importance. The earth satelites remind us every ninety minutes or so of the necessity to think the possible.

If credence is to be given the claim that our current methodology in education cripples our youth, further explanation of what I mean by *thinking in terms of what is actual* and *thinking in terms of what is possible is in order.*

THINKING WHAT IS ACTUAL

Thinking in terms of the actual is the thinking we do when we describe particular objects or events. Our thoughts about the actual take the form, 'Here is a . . .' That is to say, they are expressed in categorical statements. For instance, 'Here is a black crow.' is such a statement. Furthermore, thinking in terms of the actual leads us to summarise our descriptions about experience. We set forth descriptive generalizations such as, 'All crows are black.' When descriptive generalizations are a part of science, they are known as empirical laws. Boyle's law—'At constant temperature, the volume of a gas varies inversely with the external pressure.' is an example from the physical sciences.

Thinking what is actual is of course, a necessary skill for the isolation of objects and events from experience and for the grouping together of isolates of like kind. Descriptive generalizations are important tools in analytical thinking. They are used widely in every day affairs, as well as in science. Descriptive generalizations, unfortunately, are often regarded as the essence of thinking and of science. Consider the following statements: "Science," one student reported on an examination paper, "is a factual study built on definite concrete knowledge;" "The study of science is a purely physical task," reported another. How often have you read or heard similar statements about science? If more evidence is required that descriptive generalizations are often regarded as the essence of science, I refer the reader to any of the several textbooks in the teaching of elementary science methods. And for evidence that it is not uncommon in education to place a premium upon thinking in terms of what is actual, I suggest that the reader examine the current crop of textbooks on audio-visual methods in education.

THINKING WHAT IS POSSIBLE

Thinking what is possible is hypothetical thinking. Such thinking is characterized in part by the employment of conditional propositions which are of the form, 'if p then q.' A proposition of this form is suppositional.

In the sciences conditional statements are often about inferred entities—e.g., statements about molecules or atoms or electrons. Consider the following statement: 'If the kinetic energy of a gas is increased then molecules travel at a higher rate of velocity.' The inferred entity, molecule, which is talked about in the preceding statement differs from an actual entity. It is derived, not observed. Thus, the statement is suppositional rather than actual.

Hypothetical thinking also employs the contrary-to-fact statement which differs from the conditional statement in being expressed in the subjunctive mood. For example, the chemist states: "If the temperature were to fall to —273°C there would be zero volume." This statement does not relate directly to what is actual. All known substances solidify at a temperature above —273°C, thereby

fixing observable volume at some definite value greater than zero. Every schoolboy and every physical scientist uses the concept of Absolute Zero, a concept which is derived from the proposition just stated. Although the schoolboy may be, the scientist is not disturbed by the obvious discrepancy between his thinking and his experience of the actual. The scientist knows that he can describe the actual with greater certainty by considering what is possible, rather than by solely considering what is actual.

HYPOTHETICAL THINKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING

We have seen that analytical thinking has, at least, two characteristics: description of the actual and consideration of the possible. It is now my intention to point out that problem solving relies more on hypothetical thinking than it does on description of particulars and descriptive generalizations.

Much is made of the importance of contact between the thinker and something actual. Emphasis is placed upon experience of the actual. It must be noted that the experience of the possible is justifiable, in science, only so far as it is rooted in what is actual. Such a prescription is necessary if wild speculation is to be avoided. Some educators, place too high a premium, however, on description and descriptive generalizations. Problem solving is looked upon merely as a guess concerning the conclusions of the study which are to be expressed in the form of descriptive generalizations. Such a procedure would never conclude with a derived entity such as Absolute Zero, for the particulars which could be observed say nothing directly about it—indeed, they are all against such a formulation. Absolute Zero is a hypothetical entity, remains a hypothetical entity, but it provides, nevertheless, part of the means for solving certain kinds of problems.

The function of hypothetical thinking in problem solving has been minimized. The emphasis upon particulars tends to restrict thinking to that which is descriptive of what is actual and places a premium upon the weighting of hypothetical thinking on the side of the greatest number of particulars. I am not suggesting that particulars be ignored. I am suggesting that we can value particulars too highly, and may fall into the error of Comté. As Peirce put it: "Comté's own notion of a verifiable hypothesis was that it must not suppose anything that you are not able directly to observe. From such a rule it would be fair to infer that he would permit Mr. Schlieman to suppose he was going to find arms and utensils at Hissarlik but would forbid him to suppose that they were either made or used by any human being, since no such beings could ever be detected by direct percept. He ought on the same principle to forbid us to suppose that a fossil skeleton had ever belonged to a living ichthyosarus." (V.579)[1]

The history of science reveals that frequently in theory construction fruitful hypothetical thinking runs counter to what is suggested by the greater body of particulars. We are all now aware of the tremendous impact of Einstein's hypothetical thinking in our everyday world. His thinking grew out of the findings of the Michelson-Morley experiments and these, in turn, ran counter to the greater body of particulars then known about physical phenomena. Consider also De Broglie, who turned his back on the particulars and hypothesized phase waves which are mathematical devices not directly related to particulars, but which make possible mathematical reconciliation of waves and particles existing together

[1] *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. by Hartshorne and Weiss.

in mechanical motion. Schroedinger, in developing his generalized wave mechanics, likewise hypothesized special conditions that are totally absurd in so far as our actual spatial experience is concerned. He postulated nine dimensions for the helium atom and 279 dimensions for an atom of uranium, thereby resolving some of the contradictions in the wave-particle theory of matter.

Dirac's solution was even further removed from the particular than either De Broglie's or Schroedinger's. His mathematical symbols were completely general and did not define or represent any actual conditions or events. Algebraic axioms, some restrictive assumptions, the deductions from these assumptions, and the relations between the equations evolved from the entire set of building blocks for his solution to the wave-particle problem. Dirac's solution for the integration of scattered and contradictory data provides a case for problem solving which is greatly removed from the naive conception of problem solving often propounded in what is called the 'Method of Science.'

Doing things and being done by things is not the be all and end all of problem solving. Seeing possible relations within a system of thought seems to provide significant contributions to the solutions of problems.

HYPOTHETICAL THINKING AND EDUCATION

In requesting that a closer look be given to hypothetical thinking and its role in the solving of problems, I do not suggest that counting angels on pinheads is a fruitful educational exercise. Thinking about the actual is one aspect of analytical thinking. It is a necessary aspect, for it anchors hypothetical thinking ultimately to experience to which all men can attest. What I would warn against is the tendency to think what is actual so rigidly that only one possible set of relations is seen. In order to solve problems, analytical thinking must include what is possible. The thinker must not only allow for different relationships, but must break the bonds of conventional relationships and alter patterns of thinking which have become habitual or which follow exclusively the suggestions which appear to be called for by particulars.

In order to illustrate my meaning, consider the following example:

Problem

You are asked to connect the dots in the figure by means of four straight lines drawn continuously. In order to accomplish this integration, the individual must surmount certain conventions or patterns of integration which are suggested by the apparent relation of the dots:

(1) the dots mark off the area within which the lines are to be drawn,
(2) each line must pass through the same number of dots, and
(3) the figure is completely closed within the configuration of the dots. The

solution to this particular problem requires thinking which considers relationships which are not suggested by the dots themselves. A reorientation is required. The solver of this problem must think what is possible. In other words, hypothetical thinking is required, as the solution reveals.

Solution



If the foregoing analysis of the nature of hypothetical thinking has merit certain conclusions follow for education. More emphasis should be placed upon hypothetical thinking. Students should be confronted by situations which call for the reorientation of his experience. He must be asked to see possible relations. He should be encouraged to think suppositionally.

Some steps in this direction have been taken in the physcial sciences. Students are asked to solve problems of the following sort:

(1) You have a closed box which contains an infinite supply of oxygen. In the box is a lighted candle which is fastened to the bottom of the box. The box is dropped off a cliff and falls freely for several thousand feet. What would happen inside the box?

(2) You are falling freely in space. In each hand you hold a bar of the same kind of metal. One of the bars is a magnet. How can you tell which bar is the magnet?

In order to solve these problems, the student must think what is actual. He must know the particulars of science in their ordinary relationships. But it is not the knowledge of particulars alone which brings the solution. The student must think in terms of a world of experience in which there is no gravity and deduce what is possible in such a world. In other words, the student must think hypothetically.

Reorientation of thinking seems to be the first step to thinking creatively. Once reorientation occurs, habitual patterns of thinking are no longer relied upon exclusively. Insights about possible relationships, hitherto undreamed, are allowed. The thinker, whether he be a scientist or a poet, becomes free to create new theories or new language forms. In this way a new world of experience is synthesized.

Thus, it appears that education has a twofold task. First, activities should be provided which enable the student to acquire mastery of the tools, methods, and relationships which have been developed for ordering experience. Second, the student should be involved in activities which will enable him to obtain a sensitivity to possible relationships which are outside the experience in which he normally operates. The student must deal with the possible.

EDUCATION AND ITS EVASIONS

BY WILLIAM SACKSTEDER

PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DISCUSSED ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO AN IMAGE OF THE NATURE OF HUMAN LIFE. For it is that image which indicates the pattern of human excellence which is to be attained and reveals the uses to which the available materials will be put. Such an image is implicit—even when it is maintained (as at the present time) that education should avoid subordination to fixed external goals and traditions, and should engender maximum flexibility and practicality. For this entails also an image of human existence defining the educational process. And it too, like seemingly more doctrinaire predecessors, is an allegiance which rises, competes, and degenerates.

However, the pattern of human excellence which is (or is thought to be) possible or desirable varies according to historical circumstance. Thus it is impossible intelligently to discuss education apart from reference to the peculiar problems of our own time. It may indeed be that there are educational goals which are recurrent; human excellences always desirable; or materials of lasting value. But these must be rediscovered and reevaluated, in order to avoid mechanical repetition and enslavement to the accidental trappings of past convictions and irrelevant social structures. It is also possible that these eternal principles are peculiarly vacuous.

The conditions of a given era limit the educational achievements which are possible and adumbrate those which are desirable. Any age has its peculiar human problems and indicates the human excellence which is an appropriate response to them. We may look to the prevailing modes of conceiving, institutionalizing, and presenting life in any past era, and see therein both the image of man and his world to which it directed its educational efforts and the flaws to which it finally succumbed. However, if (in order to construct an educational theory) we look to the image of human life in our own times, we encounter a peculiarly embarrassing problem. For no such image is to be found.

You may have one, I may have one. But they are not the same. Our little group may share one, but our society falls into another by default. Our nation, or our supranational culture may share one; but those we tend to call our enemies deny it. We may, culturally speaking, remember one, or we may pregnantly envisage another; but either is only an ideal, and our enthusiasm is indifferently contagious.

The peculiar educational fact of our time is that there neither exists, nor is envisaged, any single compelling image of human life. In consequence we face an immense diversity of materials within which diverse images are conceived, implemented, and celebrated; and we confess a haunting uncertainty concerning the kinds of excellence with which we should respond to them. We do not know where we are going, and there is an embarrassment of riches—or false coin—in the materials which we may utilize.

An educational theory for our time can not lose itself in nostalgia for past visions nor in the zeal of prophecy. It must instead seek to construct a means whereby we can live well today in spite of the absence of a common image of human life. Since we neither possess one, nor can anticipate it, proper education will provide us with the capacity to deal intelligently with the diversity of available materials, and will permit us to construct for ourselves our own appropriate responses.

This should not, however, be regarded as a counsel of renunciation for a forlorn age. If there is a suggestion of accomodation to the second-best possibility, this is only because the first, if it exists, is not conspicuously forthcoming. Probably it is beyond the scope of human achievement here below. We may praise it as an ideal; our knowledge, our action, and our perception may even in some sense reflect bits and snatches of it. But the affairs of men are conducted under the limitations of human existence, and the most obvious of these is that we have been granted no universally welcomed revelation.

This lack may indeed be a blessing in disguise. Human affairs are also subject to the condition of time. In educational policy, more than any other concerns, any age must look to a future of more or less distance. But the enemy of the future is the success of present achievements, for these blind us to new needs, new possibilities, and new enthusiasms. Successful adaptation to new contingencies depends on versatility in both enlightenment and intimacy, and the good whose virtue is forgotten is no longer the good it was. The achievements of the present must be reachieved by their reconsideration, so that we may discover, assert, and love them afresh in the light thrown by other alternatives and new challenges.

Furthermore, security and confidence are not the only human virtues. There are values also in that courage whereby we entrust our most cherished convictions and works to an unkind world and in that affection with which we tolerate more or less gracefully the foibles and absurdities of our brothers. Our acceptances and rejections are also so much the more genuine and telling, when they are independent of social consensus and prove their own worth. Although consideration of others intervenes essentially, human achievement is an individual, not a social, matter.

Finally, variety in itself has a value. The diversities of human achievement are tremendous. No one of us can encompass them by appreciation, let alone by accomplishment or contribution. We use too middling a word when we speak highly today of toleration for diversities of various kinds. The world is rich, and our task is not so much reluctantly to put up with other peoples and their creations, as it is eagerly to discover, to admire, and to love.

Education begins always with a given tradition of human creations with which the student is faced. The educational problem for today is made by the sheer diversity of these works, and by the inconclusive relation in which we stand to them. The student, not being subject to any single monolithic influence, encounters a massive and diverse contribution from his forebears and contemporaries to which he is, in the first place, invited to assimilate and accomodate himself. Perhaps too late and too feebly he also recognizes that he is expected to choose and to contribute to it.

To a certain extent this is a problem of the excess of goods. However, if we look at the public life of the modern world, the problem does not so appear. Our human creative tradition primarily presents itself in the blandishments of advertising, popular expertise, drugstore libraries, pocket-books, Sunday-supplement psychiatry, professional disagreement, mass media entertainment, institutional preachment, friendly advice, scholarly pomposity, prevailing conformities, prevailing anticonformisms, gregarious rituals, anthropological relativism, professional legalism, Dale-Carnegieism, Sunday-school religion, paperback consolation, spectator sports, artistic fads, skirt lengths and diameters, guidance counseling, political promises, party allegiances, experts who popularise, experts who don't, our propaganda, their propaganda, news summaries telling us what to think, news summaries neglecting to tell us what to think, golden ages in the past, barbarism in the past, golden ages in the future, horror in the future, and lectures like this one. This is the sewerage of which modern life is composed. Doubtless among it is a diamond or two. Probably no age has ever been better off.

For the subject of education—for the child, or for that matter, for the adult—this mass of materials stands before him as his tradition, and his problem is how to relate himself to it. There is no other educational problem. Teachers and institutions function only to aid in establishing this relation. They are inessential to the educational situation, and to a very great extent, they may interfere with it by substituting the relation to themselves for the relation to the tradition. The virtue of a window glass is to distort as little as possible.

Any item in the human tradition relevant to education appears in the form of a communicable social creation. It is social in function, for it is created to show forth some construct which is common and consequential for some group, however minimal, into which the student is invited. Moreover, any part of the tradition, in order to appear to him, must be put in some communicative form, given some articulation, so to speak, whereby it is transferred to him. Even a slap in the face speaks. It is a creation, finally, because how it is intended, taken, or presented depends on a structure made by human ingenuity, even when the content is given in the natural world. Such creations include all of the works of man, and they may be discriminated into three inclusive types, according to the function they are primarily intended to fulfill.

1.) All of the *sciences* of man are creations made in the endeavor to formulate a conception of the world which can stand as assimilative and explanatory of the various perceptions of diverse persons. The intention is to create a formulation of a public world of which everyone's private world is an aspect. To a certain extent we are willing to treat our private perceptions as illusions of our perspective, but ultimately our perception of the possibilities for them are controlling, and we demand that the theoretical structure provided by science be adequate to their conciliation and explanation. These theoretical creations take three general forms, according to whether they purport to present the minimum conditions of possible relatedness, the minimum conditions of experienceable existence, or information concerning various discriminated kinds of things observable according to diverse abstractive systems. Ultimately all theoretical structures seek to present things as they are, but there is always a certain dubiousness or indirectness about the claim to have accomplished this.

2.) All of the moral and social *imperatives* of man are creations made in the endeavor to formulate norms which can stand as directive and harmonizing of the various activities of diverse persons. The intention is to visualize a conception of a possible ideal world of which everyone's actions are creators. To a certain extent we are willing to treat existing norms as errors of political or historical mischance, but ultimately a norm as such—i.e. when it is accepted—is taken as legitimately controlling of our actions, and we demand that the actions of men be assimilated to the practical imperatives created for their control. These practical creations take three general forms, according to whether they purport to present the existing socially accepted customs and regulations, the operations necessary to the attainment of assigned ends according to available material conditions, or the minimum practical conditions for the conciliation of some or all private worlds to each other, including our own states of consciousness at diverse times. Ultimately all practical structures seek to present things as they ideally ought to be, but there is always a certain dubiousness or limiting piety about the claim to have accomplished this.

3.) Each of these modes of creation involves a sort of enforcement. An acceptable theoretical structure entails willingness to adjust public artifacts to responsible private perceptions. An acceptable practical structure entails a demand that private actions be adjusted to presumptive public norms. In either case, when the enforcement is minimized, the relevant creation is a work of supreme artistry, whether of a theoretical type which explains and organizes many diverse experiences, or of a practical type which guides and incorporates much possible activity. A *work of art* in the more limited sense of the term occurs when neither sort of enforcement occurs. In this case a creation is presented which adequately harmonizes a public artifact and a private appreciation according to a limitation imposed by the conception of the artist or the purpose of the craftsman. Either of these imposes a kind of unity limiting the field of intention, but making possible and pregnant the peculiarly artistic conciliation of general and particular. Religion is the endeavor to remove these limitations and to regard all of existence as a work of art in this fully completed sense, but there is always a certain dubiousness about the claim to have accomplished this.

All of the materials with which the student is faced in education consist of sciences, norms, and works of art conceived in these senses. These are collectively the works of man. In a sense all of these materials may be regarded as products of art, since they are made by men's creative activities and they are continuously in the making. So far as I can perceive none of the indicated tasks is, or can be completed in definitive form. Also, the works of man, even when made under the peculiar limitations of theoretical or practical intentions, pursue always that complete harmonization between public and private worlds which the work of art achieves according to its limiting unity.

Thus education seems to be at first a muddled process of implanting in the students' consciousness portions of the diverse creations which present knowledge, i.e. science, schemata of action, i.e. norms and imperatives, and objects to be appreciated, i.e. works of art. The problem of education, however, is not one of assimilating these materials. It is relatively easy to make any item of them our own, when we have set our minds to it or see a value in doing so. And when

we have not, half-hearted assimilation, even of great masses of material, is only an impediment, and the material is happily soon forgotten.

The value of education does not lie in the storing of the head with materials, but in the use to which they are put in the process of living. This, however, depends on the relation of understanding and modification in which the student stands to his tradition—on the way in which it is allowed to impinge on his life. But this is a matter of judgment—of the student's actively and creatively making the proffered works his own in the way which enlarges his life.

The human excellence for which we must educate today consists principally in the art of judgment. Under the motley modern tradition, in the absence of final sciences, generally accepted norms, or pervasive artistic styles, one must be able to find one's way among the diverse offerings with which we are presented. We must possess a heightened capacity to discover and understand among the diversity, to evaluate and choose where necessary, and to contribute and enjoy. But all of these operations, when undertaken in the absence of mechanically accepted standards, depend on an act of creative judgment whereby established or novel general accomplishments are perceived as impinging creatively on particular situations, and as being embodied in them. This is absolutely necessary. The excellence with which we live depends on our capacity to handle with some soundness of judgment the immense bombardment which the modern world foists on us. Thus the primary goal of education today should be the development of judgment on the part of the student. There are other goals, of course, but they are secondary, and to a very large extent they can be criticized for interfering with the primary goal.

Judgment however should not be taken here as a mechanical process, as our logic texts sometimes say, of bringing the particular under a given generality according to the tallying of qualities. The kind of judgment I mean is that which occurs when the generalities involved are structural possibilities which are uncertain or multiple, and our problem is one of understanding, choosing, or making them—that is of bringing them to bear appropriately on our particular limitations, needs, or energies. It is this problem we face when the diverse works of man stand before us with varying and uncertain degrees of truth and falsity, guidance and betrayal, or beauty and deformity, and we demand of them some sort of adequacy to the problems of our particular situation. Here we must understand, choose, and create. The capacity to do these things in the absence of assurance I call judgment. Our position here is not unlike that of the critic in the arts: he is not without rules to go by, but all of them have exceptions, and they contradict each other anyhow. On the other hand, his whole function is denied by the assertion that there is nothing to go by and he may just say anything that comes to mind. The consequences—if he is a good critic—is that he himself creates a minor and derivative work of art, wherein a new patterning of insights and new applications of relevant commonalities enlightens and reveals the nature of the work under examination. Our practical problem of the business of living, under such help as we receive from our tradition, is something like this.

Judgment is thus a capacity to be developed in the student—a technique, or an art. The simple notion of education as the reception of given truths and direction will not serve at all. Although we are unable to function at all without

the materials of our tradition, our attention turns rather to the student—to his capacities, inhibitions, and energies.

It might be questioned, however, whether judgment, as an art in this sense can be taught at all. I am not going to make any elaborate defense of the hope that it can. I suspect that at best it is a rather sporadic business. However, there are various rather obvious things about the mode of teaching which follow from the simple fact that we are teaching an art or skill and not materials to be absorbed.

In the first place, an art is taught by active doing on the part of the student, by what piano teachers call practice. In education for judgment, this is stimulated by putting the student continuously into a situation where judgment is required. Nothing is happier here than the conflict of authorities. It turns out to be fortunate that our tradition of human accomplishment involves all sorts of conflicting positions. A practical urgency in the absence of recognized authorities is also helpful. Sometimes one learns to swim by being pushed into the deep end of the pool. This may require deprivation of childish conviction, of misshaped habit, and of simple pleasures. Notice that a corollary here is that education is never easy. It involves toil, necessity, and loss.

In the second place, an art is taught by exemplification for the student. This may be one directly by the teacher, and it is consequently fortunate that a bad example is as good, or perhaps even better, than a splendid one. Excellence of judgment carries with it an obviousness which insinuates automatic acceptance, whereas a gross error stimulates anger and effort to correct and a relatively subtle error enlivens our detective instincts and an equally subtle discrimination. Observation of successful and disastrous efforts by fellow students is important also. Moreover, the works of the traditions (when they are not taken simply as something concerning which we are required to accumulate information) are themselves instances of the accomplishment of judgment and the related arts, instances of human creation under stress. They may serve as examples of the operation of judgment—if we actively pursue with them their problems, suffer with them their difficulties, and labor with their creative effort. In this venture the teacher may be only a handmaiden who opens doors making possible significant contact with the works of the past.

In the third place the development of an art requires a continuous reassessment of the products. For judgment, this demands relevance to basic and immediate problems. It is safe to say that any of the works of the past which cannot be so presented may be relegated to antiquarians. I am not, however, under this rubric, recommending that the kiddies play corner-grocery all of the time. Assessment of possible application of an artifact is an operation of the intellect, and is necessary to the discovery of its meaning. It may be imagined and criticised in the classroom or the study. This demands also that the student be allowed and prodded to expand his own creations, or ones secondarily entertained, to their last consequence, and under their own or substitute critical powers.

Finally, there are various subsidiary and mechanical skills which are necessary for entrance into the tradition of the intellect. These go a long way toward making education in the development of judgment at least possible. It may

even thereby become an operation independent of classrooms, institutions, and elderly mentors. I am merely saying that literacy helps. The works of the mind are all necessarily embedded in some medium of communication—they are part of the tradition because they have been made common. They are articulated in some way, and to an immensely great extent, that way is verbal. Not always. The notable exceptions are works of music and painting, but we are aided here by natural delight in the exercise of the senses. In the case of language, however, such natural delight as we have is systematically strangled by prevailing educational devices, and the result at the college level is an appalling incapacity to decipher the written word, let alone create it. We also have a deplorable lack of sophistication about the distortions imposed on our insight by our native tongue, or for that matter by any verbal formulation concerning a non-verbal world.

I hope it will be noticed that under each of these headings it is necessary to use the massive tradition of human works as materials, irritants, examples, exercises, and accomplishments. I do not in any sense recommend the diminution of interest in a subject matter, but only the reorientation of that interest. My pursuit of judgment as an art, and some (but not all) of my philosophic principles, make my vocabulary ring suspiciously like recent endeavors to make methodology supreme and to see to it that our teachers are well educated in the stages of reading readiness and scrupulously ignorant of any significant works to be read. I am not recommending that Johnny learn to read when he feels like it, that classes be conducted in a non-directive vacuum, or that a new world will be created by discarding all of the Great Books—or for that matter by reading them. So far as I can see education can never concern itself with anything other than the truths which have been discovered to date, the best imperatives currently available, and the works of art which have survived. But the critical question is not what we are occupied with—it is sometimes surprising how well a poor work will serve—but how we are occupied with it.

My remarks may suggest to you some bias respecting the ideological conflict between the liberal arts and technology. The apparatus I have set up does not cut directly to that problem; to a certain extent, it turns it upside down. However I am suggesting a basic conflict, and it is tempting to label education directed to the development of judgment as "liberal arts" (implying these are by definition good) and the evasions of it (which I shall discuss momently) as technology (implying that it is by definition secondary). I am tempted to this on the ground that it is just those arts developing judgment which free a man in the contemporary situation—free him from submission to some one of those traditions, anticipations, or current fads which has the answers all encapsulated. Also, the materials which traditionally enter into liberal arts education seem to be to a very great extent the materials which exemplify, exercise, and encourage judgment. Conversely, the tendency of technological education, as I understand it, is to separate out some special and unquestioned aim to be accomplished—building a bridge is the example that comes to my mind—and foists on the student, with a doubtless justifiable degree of rigidity, the knowledge available about how to do it—for example the stress capacity of various available materials.

However, honesty compels me to admit that I could also make a fairly good case for exactly the opposite identification. I am sad to say that most of the evasions

of the true educational task which I am going to present seem to me to be characteristic of the teaching of the liberal arts curriculum. It could be argued that liberal arts education systematically and traditionally sets itself to finding ways of side-stepping the real problem of education. Conversely, whatever other vices it has, the technological curricula have in general sustained the virtue of keeping an eye to the utilities and applications which can be made of the available insights. In spite of apparent rigidities, they have progressed, and remained open to progress. Perhaps the liberal arts curricula have been moribund for centuries, while a certain concern for judgment creeps into seemingly technological circles—for example the use of the case-study method in the Harvard Business School and in many law schools or various "problems" approaches in engineering schools. Finally, I have called judgment a technique, and it does not seem to me to stretch the vocabulary too much to say that all education depends on a vast technology, although in this case the end is what is tritely called "living" and the tools are anything that happens to be lying about or newly conceivable in the tradition of all mankind.

I suspect that the really pertinent distinction between liberal arts and technology is some analogue of the whole/part distinction. This cuts across the critical distinctions we have made, for technologies are simply provisional and temporary isolations made in the interests of development of judgment about some special group of phenonema, and the liberal arts materials may be taken in too limited or too specialized a way. Looked at in this way, my remarks apply equally to both categories of education, though they slant the argument in the direction of the continual priority of the liberal arts. If these are concerned with the judgment relevant to all aspects of living (and consequently with the fitting together of the various aspects), they are in principle basic and requisite for all potential persons, whatever subsequent technology they might also take up. We all live, or partly live, but very few of us build bridges. Indeed, implicitly or not, any special province is significant only in terms of that judgment of its value which isolates it and shows its place in a larger whole. However, lest I be accused of distributing my compliments inequitably, I hasten to add that the aims of most of the technological types of education are fairly obvious and unquestionable (like health, in the case of medicine), while many of the disciplines often listed under the liberal arts have an incredible tendency to specialization and hence technicalization of their materials without one hundredth the justification. It can be argued that the proper role of the liberal arts is possible only when professional erudition is forgotten, and attention is turned to the tendency of materials at hand to enlightenment of general living. I will qualify this however by admitting that some expertise is necessary for such subsidiary purposes as training a new generation of Ph.D.'s, supplying the journals with materials, and keeping the records straight on a few details that are likely to be overlooked or forgotten.

I should like to append remarks concerning two problems which come to the fore when liberal and technological education are contrasted. The first concerns the problem of earning a living—an activity which, heaven knows, I favor. It is sometimes argued that liberal education is a highly worthwhile luxury, but one which must be curtailed, as is generally true of luxuries, in the interests of more mundane considerations. To a certain extent this argument is sound, but it needs qualification. I shall never deny the priority of earning a living. But

once we have managed to survive, the next important problem is what we do with our living and how we can go about living well. I am not sure that liberal education today, or in any other day, aptly answers this question. And I confess a considerable faith in the capacity of the unlettered man-in-the-street to do a better job of it than many intellectuals. Nonetheless, I am inclined to think that the right materials for consciousness of these questions and of a healthy variety of possible answers (though not *the answer*) are to be found in the curriculum of arts and sciences, and that aquaintance with these, tempered with considerable skepticism about them, is all to the good. When the accumulation of information about them and the inculcation of current expertise are forsaken, they are the best materials for expansion of insight into problems, suggestion of possible solutions, and sharpening of critical capacities—that is for the exercise of judgment. Thus real education might even be possible. Judgment is necessary 24 hours of the day, as opposed to the eight or so we labor, and in all of the avenues of life, as opposed to one. On the other hand, it must not be blinked that, although the potential values of liberal education for living in this broad sense are incalculable, we are also unable to calculate whether these effects actually take place, or whether there might be harmful side-effects.

The other point on which I wish to pause is Sputnik-induced educational anxiety. The kind of hand wringing about education that has gone on this past year seems to me largely to portent a disastrous displacement between liberal arts and technology. What is called for is more mathematics and physics, but by this Washington seems to mean, not the kind of things which respectively concerned Lobachevski and Einstein, but rather the kind of thing which respectively concern a mind machine and a television repairman. That is to say our educational lapses are reduced to deficiency in specialized technologies. In the short run, limited kinds of technological education may be the chief current requisite. The Soviet Union has snatched a plum or two in this race. But in the long run, technical advancement depends on science in a different sense, and this in turn is a liberal art, and is involved intimately with other liberal arts, and with a critical capacity for judgment. An Einstein is a man of supreme breadth of education, and he produces a relativity theory, among other things, because some mathematicians before him pursued diligently what is on the face of it one of the nuttiest notions that ever occurred to the mind of man. Here also, technology is of tremendous value, and unfortunately its effects are fairly calculable, while the breakthrough which ultimately enlightens the world is uncertain, immeasurable, and whimsical.

Technological education has its dangers when it is taken as self-sufficient or as inclusive. It is nonetheless necessary and possible and has the greatest value in its place. I do not wish to seem critical of it, or to include it under my listing of the evasions of education. Ultimately the kind of judgment with which I am concerned is more fundamentally allied with the liberal arts. But so far as I can see, the evasions of it which are possible do not come from technology itself, but from a kind of technicalization or professionalization of the liberal arts curriculum. It is to these that I should like to turn for the remainder of my paper.

If the primary purpose of education is development of judgment, and judgment refers here to that kind of capacity which is able to make sound applications

when exact knowledge, certain directives, or artistic models are lacking, then it follows that the evasions of education consist in dependence on those factors which obviate the necessity for judgment in this sense. In each of them some factor is found which is substituted for judgment. The effect is always to insinuate a superficial relationship to some lesser work for that greater work which is possible or for a relation more intimate. In general terms, this always involves the interposition of some third term—teacher, institution, or custom—between the student and his heritage.

I might as well present my most shocking conclusion first. The factor which is primarily responsible for the evasion of education is knowledge. I do not wish to minimize the violence of this statement. Ask any man-on-the-street, ask any legislator, ask the student, ask the professor "What is the business of education?" and they will answer off-hand that it is the acquisition and dispensing of knowledge. Even ask me, in a less whimsical moment, and I will admit that a little knowledge is a fairly handy thing to pick up. We are nonetheless all deluded. However useful information may occasionally be, it is incidental to the real business of education, and by and large it constitutes the diabolical device whereby we evade that business.

Allow me to labor an example which shows the sort of evasion I mean. Let us suppose that for some reason or other we happen to be dealing with *Hamlet*. Now there is a tremendous amount that can be known about this play. We can know when it was produced, we can know much about the times in which it was produced, we can make a great to-do about knowing or not knowing who wrote it, we can know what discrepant quartes, folios, and ur-texts there are, we can know how frequently rhymed couplets occur in it, we can know where the plot was stolen, and we can know in part how it was produced. The only thing we cannot know is the play. We can only meet it, as we meet a person we love. We can be appalled, horrified, calmed, enlightened, struck, or rejuvenated. I suppose the true business of an educational meeting with the play is to be some or all of these things. But we cannot know it.

Now this is a highly embarrassing situation. It is embarrassing for the teacher, for it might seem that there is nothing for him to do but say to the student, in effect, "There it is. Look at it. Do you see it? . . . Well, try again." It is embarrassing for the student, for he wants to be secure about just what he is up to, and he is never sure whether he "sees it." No one is ever sure whether they have "seen" *Hamlet*. Moreover, there are such things as notes, exams, coverage, grades, degrees, and recommendations to be worried about.

The temptation, almost insuperable to this point, is to fill up the gap with what can be known. Much easier for the teacher to occupy an hour this way. Note taking no problem. Can be sure of what you know: "*Hamlet:* first produced, 1601." Exam problem simplified: "Hamlet: first produced 1605. T or F? "T." "Ah-ha! out goes that one." "Well, better luck next time." But some of the facts are not so easily known. Excellent! The professor can become an expert. "So-and-so-said-such-and-such-but-on-the-other-hand-in-the-eighteenth-century . . ." It might make a neat little paper, that bit. Might help on the promotion, too. The possibilities are infinite, and the knowledge of the world will forever be augmented.

Yet somewhere in the interstices of all this, there is the play, and one might ask in a passing moment, "What does it mean?" Dare we say, "My God, I don't know?" Better not. Profs are kindly, and students are eager. Take a stab at it, but throw in some qualifications. "It seems to me . . ." "You can look at it this way . . ." Or speak of Goethe and flower-pots. You can get a nice little essay question out of that one. But don't spend too much time on it. There are thirty-five other plays. Perhaps they'd better just read up on *Measure for Measure* in Barnes and Noble. Can take care of Sheridan and Goldsmith that way, too.

Now is the play really lost in all of this? Of course it isn't. There it is, as big as life, and occasionally a student meets it, by the sheer fact of reading it—if he isn't trying to cover a book-list for his orals. These are evasions, and an evasion is rarely complete and often betrays itself. These are merely shadows which might be taken for the real thing, and be substituted for it under the demands of lassitude, calculability, and status.

Moreover, let us not overstate the case. Much of this knowledge is of considerable help in meeting the play. One of the most agonizing moments in *Hamlet* depends on the information—not, I think, stated in the play—that violets are understood as standing for faithfulness. Also, some of the total problem of the play is cleared up by a little simple information about ghosts. We are willing to grant the playwright the use of ghosts, but we think him a little simple-minded for it, and consequently we are simple-minded about the ghost ourselves. Having granted it reluctantly, we enthusiastically take it at face-value. But the Elizabethan was much more sophisticated about ghosts. As Hamlet himself tells us, they may be "true ghosts," but on the other hand they may also be diabolic emissaries sent to lead us "toward the flood." Some, but not all of Hamlet's hesitations are made much more understandable and terrible by this information. Mr. Kittridge very helpfully gives it to us in a footnote, in case we took Hamlet's speech as mere rhetoric occasioned by the excitement of the moment. Also we might get considerable help in meeting the play by toying with various interpretations, even including the professor's if we can steel ourselves against its authority. But this depends also on our playing with them in ways which might be *either* profound or foolish. For example, we might try reversing Goethe's flower-pot and oak-tree metaphor.

The danger does not lie in knowledge in itself, which may indeed be very helpful, but in the temptation to substitute it for the primary task before us. It gives status to the teacher and confidence to the student. Also, it substitutes a task which is as easy as it is mechanical for another which is most difficult, if not impossible. What is overlooked is the student's development of judgment. But to succeed in this, our task is rather to encourage the student to face the play for himself. I suppose it matters very little in the final analysis whether a student has read *Hamlet*, let alone whether he has learnt any of the information about the play which he will very quickly forget anyhow. But it matters immensely whether he has faced some literary works of comparable stature in a way that involves more than the accumulation of information about them, their authors, their times, and their interpretations. It matters whether he has tellingly faced the fact that a drama can poignantly reflect and enlarge his own most intimate life. For in so

facing this, he will be engaged in a manner which demands an expansion of his capacity to understand, analyse, and assimilate a monumental dramatic work; which demands that he construct, reject, and reconstruct his own insights concerning it; which demands that he assess its worth, and in the process, the criteria of literary worth, and the illumination of life that drama presents to us; and which demands that he retrace for himself the urgencies, triumphs, and disappointments of dramatic creation. In this way the possibilities of a way of life are opened to him, and with them the fullest appreciation of its finest products plus ability to withstand the allurements of its imitations designed for mass consumption.

Now perhaps many of you will be willing to grant me my case that knowledge is by and large an evasion of the true educational use in developing appreciation of works of art. But you might explain that this is true in this case because here the real intent is not knowledge in any strict sense anyhow. It is essentially a matter of taste—each to his own—without objective criteria. Here there is nothing to deal with but an interplay of conflicting interpretations. Such, you might argue according to your various persuasions, is the misfortune of all such fields as the arts, the social studies, or philosophy. But in the case of a true science, you will say, there are objective standards, and the educational problem reduces to the conveyance of the best contemporary knowledge concerning the subject.

Now at some risk to your faith in my sanity, I shall argue that in the case of the sciences too, and in an analogous manner, the great evasion of the task of education is the conveyance of knowledge.

This paradox might be made plausible by a simple historical note. In the fourteenth century, it was known that the sun and planets revolved about the earth. In the eighteenth century it was known that animal species were independently created. I have no doubt there are places in the world today where it is known that the earth is flat. It takes a considerable arrogance, consequently, to say anything except that what we know today is simply the best insight we have been able to muster, or to doubt that much of what is known today will tomorrow be found false or partial. Rather it should be taught with a certain qualification, and with an eye to assessment of the methods on which it depends. Yet this may only elevate indoctrination to the level of the discussion of method, with the added danger of vacuity.

The real temptation is to reduce science to a mere body of conclusions whose absorption will be substituted for education. This is the analogue of the treatment of works of art in terms of what can be known about them. A scientific conclusion has meaning or truth only in relation to the body of knowledge of which it is a part, and that body of knowledge in turn is structured by special conceptions of appropriate evidence, appropriate modes for formulation, appropriate selections of subject-matter, and appropriate commitments concerning the nature of the scientific enterprise. Taken as simple facts which may be isolated from this intellectual structure, they are false or at best misleading. Moreover, the progress of science comes as much (if not more) from the alteration of the favored intellectual structure as from the accumulation of data.

If scientific truth depends in this way on a whole and systematic intellectual organization, two educational necessities are imposed which are largely violated

by the bare transfer of conclusions. First, the student must be made aware of the intellectual structure on which given scientific information depends. But this is not so much itself a further information to be conveyed as an insight to be elicited. Exposition of the structure only pushes the problem back one step. Real understanding of it requires a changing of perspective and interest into which we must be jolted. We are only incidentally talked into it. Probably the most helpful way in which this is accomplished is by pushing the students into problems where there are conflicting analyses, by making him deal with the problem of assessment and reformulation himself, or by giving plausibility to modes of science which conflict with his own or prevailing prejudice. Perhaps the most valuable acquisition a chemistry department could make today would be a competent and thoroughly convinced phlogiston man. The second necessity is that the student require some sophistication and perspective concerning the whole scientific enterprise. This is much more important than any scientific conclusions which might be learnt and vaguely or dogmatically remembered. For the non-professional student, this insight is necessary for his future understanding of the concerns, enticements, and disappointments of scientific investigation, and for his simple independence of the authority of current scientists. For the future scientist this insight is his insurance that his high calling will not degenerate into automatic repetition of what has preceded him and to dogmatic prevention of new scientific ventures. It is one of the greatest ironies of contemporary education that introductory courses in most of the sciences present conclusions and manipulations apart from the intellectual apparatus and empirical investigations which give them validity; that they are presented with a dogmatism that belies the finest virtue of science; and that they are often false anyhow and need to be untaught before students are prepared for advanced work.

Symmetry suggests that I develop a third sense in which knowledge interferes with the fundamental task of education, now having reference to the educational discovery and judgment of norms, social and moral. I shall not develop this at length, however. In a sense, norms stand half-way between works of art and the sciences. Consequently, education concerning them has a considerable tendency to fall into either of the errors I have discussed at length. The same warnings accordingly apply. In either case information about them is substituted for consideration of their bases, implications, and value. Yet study of this diversity does have some value if it is coupled with some sense of the difficulties and requirements of practical choice and of the urgencies which give rise to efforts to submit them to rule. In general, this aspect of the works of man is excluded from higher education, and left in the hands of parents, companions, country clubs, films, sororities, law-courts, Sunday-schools, popular applications of science, and public school teachers in their baby-sitting capacity. This is probably unfortunate, but I shall not labor the point here. Also, I have no alternative proposal, except to suggest that education to judgment in the appropriate senses may perhaps be an incidental advantage of proper treatment of works of literature. I also suspect that the investigation of the variant norms of many cultures is of value, if it can be accomplished without an intellectual framework which vehemently proposes, in the enthusiasm of its later chapters, norms of a sort suspiciously similar to these which it has vehemently denied in the relativism of its earlier chapters. Perhaps, however, virtue cannot be taught.

The second major substitute which serves for the evasion of education is

history. I do not refer here to that study of history which simply provides a kind of knowledge whose accumulation may be extensively substituted for intimacy and immediacy in ways which have already been shown. Nor do I refer to the study of history within its own province, which is a discipline of immense value. I am disturbed rather by the reference to history as a criterion for the definitive resolution of issues. In this way historical analysis is allowed to usurp the prerogatives of other kinds of questions and ultimately to destroy the possibility of genuine education. In its most subtle form, this depends on a special theory of history. But such theories themselves are neither sciences in the full sense, nor facts in the immediate historical sense. They are immense pragmatic mythologies organized in part by selections and orderings derived from the urgencies of the practical situation from which they arise.

I have already cited possibilities of being misled by the quest for historical erudition in the discussion of *Hamlet*. A more disastrous evasion occurs when we substitute some historical relation for the critical evaluation of works of art. We might do this by a worship of the archaic or by a futile quest for novelty for its own sake. We might also have some pet theory about the evolution of artistic style from which we can deduce instructions for present effort or justification for allegiance to a preferred school with rejection of others. In either case, history is substituted for esthetic evaluation and thereby allowed to guide our choices, our understandings and our creative efforts. Professionals are peculiarly liable to this fallacy, and the temptation to convey information giving it plausibility is a peculiarly prevalent and subtle device for evading the solicitation of independent esthetic judgment. Thus a kind of upper-echelon faddism is introduced into the universities.

The sciences show little inclination to be side-tracked by the quest for historical erudition. If anything, the prevailing vice is rather the reverse. Ignorance of past problems and solutions tends to prevent genuine feeling for alternative modes of accomplishment, for the intellectual alternations of scientific progress, or for the stubbornesses of facts, concepts, and men. The root of this neglect is the same sort of historical fallacy which we found hampering esthetic judgment. Put baldly, the assumption is that, since the past versions of a science are old, they are out-dated and superceded and therefore false. This reverses the snobbism in the arts whereby the archaic has a kind of charm, and the novel seems to lack beauty, technique, and importance. In either case, notice of the temporal relationship to the present is substituted for the task of evaluation in the appropriate sense. The proper scientific question is whether a formulation is true, and proper education is evaded when any historical reference is allowed to prevent this question.

History always chooses, but it chooses after the fact, and is only of help, never of decisive selectivity, with respect to a choice of action or evaluation in the present. From our present position, the future always has some degree of uncertainty. To take historical knowledge as significantly guiding our choices is an absurdity in the quest for truth and beauty, but it is an incredible violence in the moral and political spheres. Here we are tempted to such oddities as reverence for institutions or customs simply because they are old or abhorrence for institutions and customs simply because they are old-fashioned. The proper question is rather whether they serve the present well. We prevent this question,

by and large, by historical reference. We may even deny it entirely, by arguing that there are no grounds of choice at all on the evidence that things are done otherwise elsewhere or at other times. The subtler version of these same fallacies maintains that an analysis of present conditions or an insight into the sweep of events is sufficient to tell us what is good or what ought to be done. The education which depends on such historical references evades the task of judgment whereby we find and make significant grounds for choice, and thus removes the necessity for practical judgment by the student.

A third and final evasion of the task of education is based on the reduction of education to the acquisition of techniques. This is skirting perilously near to my own positive analysis, since I have called education the acquisition of an art of judgment. Judgment, however, is a skill of utmost generality, inclusions, and interconnection. It is also of exquisite unpredictability and involves extremely soul-searching difficulty. In these senses it is quite distinct from the kind of techniques which are sought today. The popular technicalization of today takes the form of "How-to-play-the-piano-in-twenty-easy-lessons." Academic versions are not too far from this in their emphasis on ease, their limitation to a set end, and the supreme assurance that minimum gifts, attention and accomplishment are sufficient. A technique, as I shall use the term here, is directed toward a specific and limited end. It thus always depends on a prior assumption of the worth of that end and its place in a larger whole.

Education in the arts is peculiarly liable to the technical perversion. Technical competence is necessary, of course, for any artistic accomplishment. A minimum technical effort is probably also a considerable asset to appreciation. However it is an old saw that technique alone is not enough, that it produces only art without soul and an artist with an incomplete life. I suspect acquisition of "soul" requires exercise beyond that of the particular mode of artistic expression. Also some distance from the favored form is necessary before the snares of sheer virtuosity may be avoided. Technique is not an evasion because of its worthlessness. I would be aided in my present tasks, had I been taught to typewrite properly, and had I been initiated into the mysteries of English spelling. Technique is an evasion because the worth it has may seem sufficient, and we may fail to educate for that judgment of place and derivative worth which enlightens it.

There is a technicalization of the moral and social aspects of education also. In popular educational materials, this takes the form of tracts on how to win friends, peace of mind, or a technically competent sex life. I fear there is some tendency toward an academic equivalent of this in departments devoted principally to such arts as influencing people rhetorically, teaching by proper methods, utilizing the legal structure, or popularizing news. I shudder to think what is going on in the high schools under the heading of "Education for Living." An enormous amount of extracurricular energy is also directed along such lines. For example, I suspect that the genuine educational function of fraternities and sororities is a technicalization of dating, dress, social niceties, and beating the academic racket. All of these functions, academic or otherwise, are of course quite necessary. However all such pursuits are fraught with moral assumptions and implications which tend to be lost or denied by the reduction to the relevant technique. A law student, for example, is necessarily concerned for a massive percentage of his efforts with

the techniques for discovering and utilizing the existing law of his society. But even if he is not potential material for a Senator or a Supreme Court Justice, he must have some idea what the legislatures or courts are about when they alter and create law. If he is to use law wisely, he must also have some notions of the customary and political force that gives positive law its validity, and as a man he might even develop some integrity concerning the uses to which legal talents may be put. It might also help to ask what law is. I suspect there are analogous hidden questions in the institutionalization of Jimmie and Suzie's dating habits.

The technicalization of the sciences is equally dangerous. Science is more than a technology so far as concerns its progress, its highest aims, and its esthetic charm. It is an adventure, and the attraction of an adventure depends on the possibility that it might fail. In technicalizing science, we tend to reduce it to aspects under which success is assured and results are immediate. In the long run of course this is the death of science, and perhaps it is the principal danger to be feared in an age when publics and presidents have come to regard sciences as pretty important stuff. So far as concerns liberal education for students unable to study sciences for complete technical competence, the remaining use for science when it is technically conceived is to admire and accept the authority of the expert. Science in its modern sense began with a revolt against this sort of thing. And true scientific education requires some sensitivity to a spirit of high adventure.

In each of these three broad types of evasion of education, some substitution is made which prevents the proper relation of the student to some artifact in his tradition. In the evasions based on knowledge, some information about the external world is taken as sufficient and immediate, and is substituted for the immediate awareness or direct contact from which our theoretical efforts are more properly derived or for the effort to create a new artifact. In the evasions based on history some pet theory of history projected from the pragmatic necessities of the subject is taken as a portrayal of the world outside sufficient to yield criteria of evaluative significance. In the evasions based on pursuit of technique, subject and object are properly related without substitution, but a partial relation is taken as sufficient—which denies or to some degree obscures the whole relationship from which it is derived and the implicit judgment which makes the isolation possible.

Now my discussion of the evasions of education has been in terms of a schema of facets of education and the kinds of opposites to which they might be reduced. I have only incidentally mentioned concrete devices and methods which aid and abet in these evasions. In closing, I should like to mention various particular sorts of educational tools which seem to me to have a peculiar tendency to encourage the evasions and to divert the true course of education. I say "tendency," for these devices no doubt have good uses and their deleterious effects may be avoided.

1.) The first evasive device is the ubiquitous use of the text-book. This diabolical tool is scrupulously designed to reduce education to a technique and to avoid the active creation of judgment by the students. Issues entailing authoritative controversy or scientific self-doubt are evaded or covered up rhetorically. Where there is agreement, contents are presented as blank and unquestionable facts, having no dependence on theoretical principles and no more

than a pious relation to evidence. Contact with the efforts of great minds is prevented, and every effort is made to make profound matters easily digestible. There is considerable tendency to resort to a pseudo-historical organizing principle which begs most of the important questions. Trust in authority is encouraged, and matters of great moment are dubbed so easy that the sophomore soon fancies himself an authority.

2.) We have a horrifying tendency to sacrifice acquaintance to coverage. The pricks of historical conscience convince us that a rapid survey of a whole history is better than deep and genuine involvement with a few typical instances. For example, in the arts, we tend toward surveys of, say, the history of English drama, in which a couple dozen plays are read, with plot summaries of a hundred or so others. Nevertheless, all but the preprofessional jobs are done rather by deep intimacy, skill in analysis, and the development of love for a few.

3.) The lecture system of teaching visualizes education primarily as the pouring of information into the heads of the students (or their note-books) from the presumably well-stocked head of the professor. Probably this vision itself is sufficient condemnation to outweigh the occasional utility of this device. Except in the rare case in which the lecture is itself a work of art, all of the vices of the textbook reappear. By and large lectures prohibit all but the most rudimentary participation by the students and disastrously lead such feeble efforts as are made toward the presentation of alternatives.

4.) Another favorite device for the evasion of education is postponement. What we teach is not quite true—or not quite in proper spirit—or short of full vision, because, we argue, the kiddies are not quite ready for the real thing. When they have matured, we say, we will correct the misapprehensions we laboriously instill during their minority. But they never mature, or when they do, they have long since departed our tender ministrations. Meanwhile it is possible to postpone and postpone real education until it is accessible to no one who follows anything but a professional pattern of life. I fear that education will not occur until hardened professors are willing to make a defiant decision that the student is ready for anything, even when this is plainly contrary to the facts.

5.) We have an odd conviction that our education should only use materials which are true, moral, or artistically excellent. But assorted kinds of desirable irritations and senses of competence can be encouraged often by analysis of the unorthodox, the outrageous, and the inept. We may be surprised also to find them better than we thought.

6.) Departmentalization has been kicked around so much that I will do no more than mention it as a force which, however necessary administratively, tends to encourage practically all of the evasions of which education is susceptible. To these it adds the urgency of vested interests.

7.) Expertise and specialization have been similarly whipped. But they also have their necessity and their place. They are an evasion only when they crowd out the conviction that things about which one specializes have some role in life greater than that of exercises for further expertise.

8.) Another favorite whipping-boy is extra-curricular activities. However I am inclined to more than my usual generosity here. Granted that this device trivializes many important functions and burns up untold energies fruitlessly, yet it invokes spirit, discrimination, effort, and engagement. Without these, education is impossible, and when they are present there is considerable possibility that highly important educational processes will take place in the interstices. Education is like love; it cannot be predicted. If an activity often detracts from higher things, it is by default, when the higher things are made to seem dead, routinized, easy, or irrelevant. At least an activity invokes consciousness.

9.) The limitations of the examination and grading system are probably patent—and equally unavoidable. The exigencies of our situation compel us to show results. As teachers, our status seems to depend on what we have gotten into the head of the student. As students, our security seems to lie in finding something to which we can cling for dear life. Who can risk the sally wherein the expert may step beyond his depth, only a few may follow, and the ostensible results may be nil.

10.) It is hardly politic for me to take the offensive against the large university, and I am indeed inclined to defend it in various ways. However, as it grows, it should not, like Alice, say goodbye to its feet. Along with the virtues attendant on size, there seem to me to be various dangers, of which I shall mention two. First, it follows from what I have been saying that education is in the ultimate analysis an extremely intimate business There should be intimacy between the student and the object of study, and this in turn depends on intimacy between the student and the teacher, and on some sense, however minimal, of a common enterprise in the intellectual activities of man. There is some danger that size leads to mechanization and distances preventing this. Also, the natural delight in activity and intimacy is largely diverted into other channels when the educative functions neglect to engage them. Secondly, a principal advantage of size is a diversity of faculty and facilities—in itself a good. The professional specializations and research competences which result from this are also good in their place. However, they have a tendency to displace the achievement of liberal education and to make primary the training of experts. This quite legitimate function must never divert or prevent faculty interest in the educational adventure of the young. They are still trying to find out what many fields of human endeavor are, what they are good for, and how they may be guarded against. This is itself a positive educational task, and one which may be neglected in the one-upmanship of professional status and in dispensation of expert opinion.

11.) Finally, I believe we are betrayed by the conviction that education should be made as easy as possible. The accomplishments of man do not come without shock and effort, and some derivative reverberations are prerequisite if students are to appreciate, understand and evaluate them. We assimilate ourselves to the creations of the past and prepare for the future only in so far as we undergo anew the doubt, inarticulateness, and painstaking effort that produces a science, or the necessities, compromises, and sacrifices that produce a social scheme, or the searching, arid periods, exaltation, and compression that produce a work of art. The young are hardy, and I believe their respect follows their effort. If we attempt to ease the shock of every intellectual contact, we may so emasculate the

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DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF COMMUNICATION AND "MINDFUL" BEHAVIOR

BY JOHN MARTIN RICH

THE RANGE OF DIRECT EXPERIENCE THAT EACH PERSON CAN GAIN IS LIMITED. Limitations of time, energy, and resources, make it impossible for the individual to gain a great range of direct experience. The individual must supplement his knowledge greatly by indirect experience (i.e., meaningful experiences which other persons undergo and communicate one to the other). The way in which individuals may greatly increase their knowledge of the world is through indirect experiences that are imparted in the process of communication. The majority of our experiences are gained in this way.

> Every step from savagery to civilization is dependent upon the invention of media which enlarge the range of purely immediate experience and give it deepened as well as wider meaning by connecting it with things which can only be signified or symbolized.[1]

Children learn the meaning of sounds by observing the actions which these sounds signify. They see the way older people use a thing, hear what they call it, try to repeat the sound and duplicate its use, and thus come to understand that the symbol stands for a specific object which is meaningful in terms of its use. That is, "the object becomes a sign of the activity into which it enters."[2]

Individuals engage in shared experiences through the act of communication. Thus, things take on meaning through their use in common experience.

> Understanding one another means that objects, including sounds, have the same value for both with respect to carrying on a common pursuit.
>
> After sounds have got meaning through connection with other things employed in a joint undertaking, they can be used in connection with other like sounds to develop new meanings, precisely as the things for which they stand are combined.[3]

But the ability to use language and share meanings with others is not as simple a process as it may seem. The infant, without access to the funded experiences of his society, would hardly develop beyond a primitive person. Activities and past events take on meaning for the child only insofar as he utilizes some way of symbolizing these events and communicating these meanings to others. The acquisition and use of meaningful communication by children is a lengthy and arduous process. Adults of society deem communication to be the *sine qua non* to insure the transmission and reordering of the culture.

Not all living things can utilize the communicative process as humans do. Dewey clarifies these differences by distinguishing three basic levels under which all existing things may be classified. The level of non-living is termed the "physi-

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[1]Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 272.
[2]*Ibid.*, p. 18.
[3]*Ibid.*

cal." Dewey illuminates the difference between living and non-living things in this statement:

> Empirically speaking, the most obvious difference between living and non-living things is that the activities of the former are characterized by needs, by efforts which are active demands to satisfy needs, and by satisfactions.[4]

Dewey is not content, however, to let this statement suffice as an adequate distinction between the non-living and the living things. He elaborates his point at great length when he describes living things as having an organizational nature in which they tend to integrate their activities in order to continue to live. Dewey notes the organizational ability of plants on this level of living, saying:

> The interactions of the various constituent parts of a plant take place in such ways as to tend to continue a characteristically organized activity; they tend to utilize conserved consequences of past activity so as to adapt subsequent changes to the needs of the integral system to which they belong.[5]

Dewey calls the level of animals and plants, "psycho-physical."[6] This does not denote something physical and something psychial. By the use of the term "psycho" in the particular context and relationship, Dewey suggests only "that physical activity has acquired additional properties, those of ability to procure a peculiar kind of interactive support of needs from surrounding media."[7] Plants and animals possess a peculiar kind of sensitivity. The activities of the various constituent parts of the organism arrange themselves in a way that proves more conducive to a patterned way of life. "Responses are not merely selective, but are discriminatory, in behalf of some results rather than others. This discrimination is the essence of sensitivity."[8]

More complex animals have feelings which cause them to direct attention along various channels of activities. Yet animals, even representatives of complex species, are unable to use language to symbolize occurrences of the past, ideas of relationship, and predictions of the future. Nonetheless, animals can extract meaning from currently confronted situations. These meanings must always be in terms of the tangible objects and things which are sensed, since animals are incapable of symbolizing that which is not a part of the present situation. One of the chief characteristics distinguishing *homo sapiens* from all animals which are on the "psycho-physical" level is their ability to use language. Given language, man may respond to objects which are absent and may bring them to bear upon the present situation. Dewey calls the level of man, "mental," in distinguishing its major characteristics from the "physical" and "psycho-physical" levels. According to Dewey, the most significant aspects of the "mental" level are the mind's activities and the function it serves.

> Mind is an added property assumed by a feeling creature when it reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, communication. Then the qualities of feeling become significant of objective differences in external

[4] Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 252.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 254.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

> things and of episodes past and to come. This state of things in which qualitative different feelings are not just had but are significant of objective differences, is mind. Feelings are no longer just felt. They have and they make sense; record and prophesy.[9]

The terms 'consciousness' and 'mind,' it should be noted, differ noticeably in the writings of John Dewey. It is possible that one can best reach an understanding of 'consciousness' in terms of its relationship to mind. Dewey interprets consciousness on the psycho-physical level as "the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences, or 'feelings'."[10] This is contrasted to the mental level. The mental level "denotes upon the plane of mind, actualized apprehensions of meanings, that is, ideas."[11] Introspective psychology devoted itself to the study of consciousness, viewing all aspects of consciousness as mental. This early development in psychology began to study mental images, sensations, perceptions, and impressions as if they were cut off from the material world. Locke's psychology conceived the mind as the mass of incoming sensations which were changed to mental images upon entering the mind. Actually, however, all one could really know were the mental images. In this system there was no way to know the external world directly. In the final analysis, one did not know his self directly, but only secondarily through the mental images formed of one's self.

Dewey recognized that not all human activity operates at the mental level as he conceives it. Instead, considerable activity takes place on the level of reverie, immediate recognition, and habit. Only when meanings are exchanged is mind in operation. "Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings."[12] Dewey further elucidates the distinction in the following:

> The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind of operative meanings—is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. . . . Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities.[13]

It is possible to become aware of consciousness by noting the changes in the succession of meanings through their shifts, modifications, and variations upon the mind. "Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meaning which at a given time is undergoing redirection, transitive transformation."[14]

Throughout the annals of philosophic thought, mind has played an indispensable role in the efforts of philosophers to explain the meaning of the universe and to fit its constituent parts rationally into the total structure. Idealism has held that the basic character of the universe is mind or spirit. It is usually the case that 'body' or material substance will be found in an inferior position to mind

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[9]Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 258.
[10]Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 303.
[11]*Ibid.*
[12]*Ibid.*
[13]*Ibid.*
[14]Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 308.

in the idealistic outlook. Of course, some philosophers do not admit the existence of any material substance; however, even with those philosophers who grant extension an inferior place in the structure of reality the vital relationship between body and mind in the thinking process is not recognized. Dewey throws considerable light on this important philosophic and educational problem.

The exact and true determination of the location of the mind has greatly troubled thinkers for centuries. Dewey does not resort to separating the mind from nature (as was commonly done by earlier philosophers). He states:

> The mind is within the world as a part of the latter's on-going process. It is marked off as mind by the fact that wherever it is found, changes take place in a directed way, so that a movement in a definite one-way-sense—from the doubtful and confused to the clear, resolved and settled takes place.[15]

In the pragmatic conception of mind proposed by Dewey, the mind is never considered to be some sort of entity. Mind and body dualisms are dissolved and the relation of the individual with his environment is conceptalized as an interrelationship. Furthermore, transcendentalism is ruled out—the mind can no longer be considered to exist in some extra-empirical realm. Human problems, according to Dewey, are not resolved by seeking prescriptions for human behavior in an ethereal realm of eternal verities.

The nature of the term, 'mental,' needs some clarification. Idealists consider sensations, themselves, as mental. The problem arises as to how the 'mental' can know the 'extra-mental.' The pragmatic solution for this problem, according to Dewey, is to recognize that

> From a strictly empirical point of view, the smell that is known is no more merely mental than is the rose known. We may, if we please, say that the smell when involving conscious meaning or intention is "mental," but this term mental does not denote some separate type of existence—existence as a state of consciousness. It denotes only the fact that the smell, a real and non-physical object, now exercises an intellectual function. This new property involves, as James has pointed out, an additive relation—a new property possessed by a non-mental object, when the object occuring in a new context, assumes a further office and use. To be "in the mind" means to be in a situation in which the function of intending is directly concerned.[16]

The way in which the organism is involved in the thinking process is clarified in the following statement by Dewey, one that has vital educational implications.

> Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds, are as much a part of it (the thinking process) as changes in the brain. Since these physical operations (including the cerebral events) and equipments are a part of thinking, thinking is mental, not because of the peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and appliances do: the distinctive purpose for which they are employed and the distinctive results which they accomplish.[17]

It is possible to say that whenever these physical means are employed to bring about conscious meaning or intention, they become a vital part of the thinking

[15]Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 291.

[16]Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 104.

[17]Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 14.

process. Dewey outlines what he believes to be the distinctive function of the thinking process:

> Thinking is instrumental to a control of the environment, a control effected through acts which would not be undertaken without the prior elements and an accompanying projection of possibilities—without, that is to say, thinking.[18]

The thinking process and ideas are interrelated. Dewey states that

> Ideas are anticipatory plans and designs which take effect in concrete reconstructions of antecedent conditions of existence. They are not innate properties of mind corresponding to ultimate prior traits of Being, nor are they *a priori* categories imposed on sense in a wholesale, once-for-all way, prior to experience so as to make it possible.[19]

To elucidate the nature and function of ideas further and conclusively, Dewey adds: "Ideas and idealism are in themselves hypotheses not finalities. Being connected to operations to be performed they are tested by the consequences of these operations, not by what exists prior to them."[20] The origin of ideas is found in an empirical, extra-mental situation which generates ideas as patterns of response, while their meaning is found in the modifications they make in the extra-mental situation. "Their validity is in term measured by their capacity to effect the transformation they intend."[21]

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[19] Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 166–67.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 167.
[21] Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 115

EDUCATION AND ITS EVASIONS

(*Continued from page 207*)

life of the intellect that vigorous youths are driven by default to the joys of the football field and the building of floats.

Now I have not said anything concerning Philosophy, and I wish I could avoid doing so. Ideally speaking, I suppose it should be eliminated. I do not see that it has any special function apart from the total of the educational purposes already discussed, at least were they handled in the way proposed. Also, I suspect that it has a tendency to muddle its way into all of the areas discriminated here, and hence to be susceptible to all of the diseases of each of them in turn. Nor do I see that it has any subject matter made up of materials having any distinction from those already discussed—except perhaps the distinction of being considered out-dated. However, under prevailing conditions, I suppose that it is to the good to have someone around questioning what everyone knows is obvious, pursuing impossible visions and ideals, toying around with improbable theories and unorthodox practices, and proposing absurd notions as to how various elements of education might fit together under some crackpot scheme of judgment. I recommend that we put up with them during good behavior.

I should like to conclude with a story concerning Johannes Brahms, the composer. Brahms was noted for being a crusty old gentleman, given to speaking his mind quite bluntly. On one occasion, when leaving a party, he paused at the door and turned to the assembled guests, saying, "If there is anyone I have neglected to insult, I apologize to him."

THE ROLE AND NATURE OF THEORY IN THE EDUCATION OF THE GIFTED

BY VIRGIL S. WARD

Introduction: The Unfortunate Dichotomy Between Theory and Practice

ON ALMOST EVERY HAND IN THE PANORAMA OF AMERICAN CULTURE A REGRETTABLE DICHOTOMY IS OBSERVED BETWEEN TWO BROAD MODES OF THOUGHT AND INQUIRY, BOTH OF WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN WELFARE. We refer to the systems of thought or behavior known as "rational," or speculative, on the one hand, and on the other "empirical," or more narrowly, "experimental." Not since Bacon in the *Novum Organum* explained how either of what he termed the "sophistic or theoretic school" or the "empiric school" of inquiry could, in isolation from the other, "corrupt natural philosophy," have these techniques of inquiry been held in proper relationship to each other.

It is known that science, by which term we mean the continuous unfolding of reliable information concerning the elements and processes of nature, moves forward through deliberate transactions between reason and deliberation on the one hand, and on the other, precise sensory observations, measurement, and careful relating of antecedent and consequent conditions in the search for cause and effect. We believe that in American science, research, whether of the "basic" or "applied"nature, has suffered from the neglect of deliberative, speculative, and critical play of intellect over its diverse enterprises.

Theory goes begging in the academic setting as well. This unfortunate dichotomy between the rational and the empirical is expressed in the production of dissertations in universities across the nation. Experimental designs, which by their nature are mere instruments of inquiry, often receive a degree of meticulous attention not similarly afforded the idea of the problem into which inquiry is pressed. To render his statistics fool-proof, and to look carefully to the role of what Sorokin calls "calculating machinery," is expected of the student in far too many institutions, with insufficient regard for the significance of the proposed problem in terms of the existing structure of science. And at the level of the education of teachers, or lawyers for that matter, what university man has not felt the impact of registration-day inquiries—sometimes timid, sometimes bold—as to whether an anticipated course will for the student be "just more theory" or "something practical and useful."

Now the power of theory to direct the practical activities of scientists, and moralists, and technologists can be experienced merely by invoking such names as Dewey in the progressive education movement, Thorndike in the psychology of learning, Freud in the study of personality, and collectively, Copernicus, Darwin,

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and Einstein in the pursuit of the natural sciences. Indeed, the writer has never been able to escape the wisdom of Dewey's observation that theory is in the end the most practical of all things because of its widening range of attention beyond nearby purpose and desire" (*Sources of a Science of Education*, 1929, p. 17).

THE STATUS OF THEORY IN THE EDUCATION OF THE GIFTED

But our concern here is with the status of theory, not in American science or education at large, but in the particular matter of education for the gifted. We have endeavored to analyze this movement with respect to those phases in which some guiding theories appear to have emerged, and those phases which appear still to function largely in accord with arbitrary judgment, local expediencies, or simple, unexamined predilections. We submit forthwith that theory exists which is sufficient for the guidance of practical endeavors in two phases of this work: i.e., in the *logical justification of special education for the gifted* as grounded in the basic idea of differential education for differential abilities; and in the area of *definition and identification*. To get the contrasting picture before us immediately, we submit that in two other phases of the enterprise, there is a dearth of theory and a consequent senseless diversity (if not chaos) at the level of practice. These areas are: *educational programming*, and *curriculum development*.

The very earliest thought in the education of exceptional children spelled out a logic for special education sufficient to embrace all classes of significantly deviant children. The idea that in the differential abilities of children, there exists a demarcation point at which experiences most appropriate for the person of "normal" ability become unsuited for the exceptional child is an adequate notion to support the search for improved experiences both for the mentally handicapped and the mentally gifted.

Now we have suggested further, possibly evoking a marked negative reaction in many thoughtful readers, the adequacy of theory in the problem of definition and indentification. But we did not suggest this idly. Throughout the history of this development, and in all the diverse contemporary approaches, essentially two threads of thought prevail. The historically older position, assumed by both Terman and Hollingworth, is that giftedness is a matter of intellectual superiority; the newer position—and one with which the writer takes serious issue—suggests a broader definition, to include specific talents and aptitudes as well as high general intellect. Now all the controversy for and against either of these positions, and all the efforts toward screening and identifying children for differential educational experience, are geared toward one or the other of these theoretical conceptions. This is what we mean by saying that this area of the problem is guided by theory. It does not mean that we think the best of these theories prevails, nor that the best of them is supported by adequate instruments for screening and identifying children. Our point is simply the existence of focal ideas which discipline and lend meaning to practical efforts at the identification of gifted pupils.

In contrast, let us reflect upon the problem of educational programming, the structuring of the daily, weekly, and yearly sequences in subject matter and personal activities so that the child's most excellent total development may occur. The so-called administrative provisions, as the reader may know, usually take such forms as ability grouping, acceleration of the pupil through the grades, or lowering certain subjects within the graded structure. Now we recognize that any of these

procedures singly is perhaps intrinsically good, and we are happy, of course, that they are widely practiced. But we submit that the absence of theory is manifest in that schools usually settle upon one or another of these discrete practices and utilize it to the exclusion of the others. For example, the school that practices ability grouping, will most likely not engage in acceleration, but will rather purport that enrichment takes care of subject matter. On the other hand, one hears school after school suggest to its public that they *do* have a program for the gifted, they are cooperating in Advanced Placement. Now in spite of all its merits, the Advanced Placement program is merely a form of acceleration, with proper regard to articulation of subject matter. It does not comprise a whole program of special education for the gifted. These various administrative devices are not best utilized in isolation. Various patterns among them should be worked out so that children could, according to their individual needs, benefit from several of these arrangements in combination, as from both moderate acceleration in grade placement *and* earlier access to individual subjects like Algebra or a foreign language.

We submit as further evidence of the absence of theory in educational programming, the awkward fact that special provisions for the gifted most often have to begin as "extras," external attachments to the required school program, rather than an integral part of it. The gifted student will thus be invited (almost under the discouraging attitude "all right, if you must; but you can't do it on school time") to study the Russian language *after school*, and on a *non-credit* basis. In a similar way, "Saturday art classes," and evening seminars on the "Great Books," are sometimes provided. A sound theory of program would arrange for the elevated experiential capacity of the intellectually superior child to exercise itself in a balanced fashion, entirely within the bounds of the normal requirements in time and place, and above all, for full credit.

But possibly the worst consequence of absence of sound perspective is the frequent substitution of what are sheerly administrative re-arrangements of a standard curriculum, for a truly unique program of experience that parallels both the child's superior learning capacity and society's need that he exercise these capacities in appropriate directions and levels. We sincerely hope, for instance, that the emphasis upon "five tough subjects" which the National Education Association and James B. Conant are stressing for the "Academically Talented" pupil will not be translated into an adequate whole program of education for the gifted. A really appropriate paralleling of the child's abilities with the broad range of man's knowledge in a culture in which both science and technology are explosively expanding, and in which problems of the human career are of unsurpassed complexity, simply cannot be arranged out of the traditional content of the American school curriculum. Imaginative and even radical departures will be essential if we attain in this important connection what Lippman has asked for in general as a "breakthrough" in educational thought. But this criticism of the dearth of theory in curriculum development leads naturally to the inquiry as to the nature of such theory. This is the principal focus of this presentation.

TOWARD A SYSTEMATIC THEORY OF THE CURRICULUM FOR THE SUPERIOR LEARNER

What should be the nature of the educative experience that qualifies as unique, in that it satisfies both the distinguishing capacities and personal needs of the intellectually superior individual, and the social problem of his most proper edu-

cation for service to mankind? We shall for this occasion refer to three points in the systematic theory embodied in a larger work,[1] in which there have been developed some twelve major "Propositions," and approximately twice as many "Corollaries," which principles we believe to pertain with relative uniqueness to the education of the gifted. We shall think of the three principles just now as involving "reversed ratios," in the sense that each of them suggests a type of reverse emphasis from the usual practice in education. In each case, the extraordinary usage is held to involve the superior abilities of the gifted person, and to provide more appropriately for the range of experiences and responsibilities likely to be assumed or thrust upon him in his life career.

The *first* of the experiential ratios which we submit must be inverted involves *the role of the intellectually superior student in his own education.* In the usual instance, educational planning seems to be centered in objective means for engendering within the pupil attitudes and tendencies toward action, and in devices external-to-the-individual for accomplishing the learning act. In planning the curriculum, in discussing methods, and in establishing requirements, the governing assumption seems to be that in the individual himself there resides no power which can be utilized, but rather that anything accomplished must take place by means of some device struck upon to "cause" the educative experience to be effective.

Typically, the gifted child is interested in school and in learning. Where developmental circumstances or health factors have been conducive to optimum maturity, the intellectual capacity, plus the intrinsic motivation which generally characterizes the gifted individual, provide a combination of psychological qualities that can be utilized in numbers of ways to further his education. Destined to assume social roles in which the continued apprehension of facts, and reflective thinking thereupon, will be urged, the concept of education as "learning how to learn" becomes especially significant for the gifted, and practices which conduce straightforwardly toward increased self-sufficiency in planning and continuing self-education take on added importance.

Teachers serve the individual who can acquire for himself the basic facts and principles of an academic discipline, not by teaching this content *per se*, but rather by indicating the problems likely to be encountered in learning it. Subsequent to individual learning, the class hour would be given to discussions of the uses and the significance of the ideas involved. In such discussions, if they are handled appropriately, the nature of the problems, insights, and concerns to emerge in a special class of gifted children will be radically different from a discussion of subject matter in the usual class. Now this heavier dependence upon the learner for learning without immediate instruction, and the reservation of the class hour for engagement in the complex and elusive subtleties lying in the richest instance just beyond the individual's present unaided grasp, comprise an alteration of usual school practices which we suggest to reverse the ratio of teaching to learning, and of learning to thinking within the class hour.

The *second* extraordinary process which we extend for consideration involves *the treatment of knowledge within the curriculum.* Again, in the usual instance the regular school curriculum is shaped through a process that tacitly recognizes a

[1]Virgil S. Ward, *Principles of Education for Intellectually Superior Individuals.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1952. Theory further developed in a forthcoming publication by Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc.

series of maxims such as these: 'Knowledge exists; the direct transmission of knowledge is good; all knowledge cannot possibly be taught; hence a selection must be made of the more reliable and useful details that are to be transmitted.' This transmission is in the order of a one-to-one relationship, i.e., the knowledge that is deemed worthy is passed on in concrete detail to the learner. What is known becomes what is learned.

Now this treatment of knowledge is not the only possible manner of educating youth in necessary skills and understandings. The rapidity of change in culture, as well as the idiosyncrasy of personality suggests the appropriateness of comprehensive exploratory investigations into practically the whole of existing knowledge, sacrificing the particulars of static, accomplished fact (which is available to any upon inquiry) for an introduction to all fields of knowledge in the manner of methodology, problems, applications, limitations, and interrelationships that pertain to each. The school's chief responsibility would thus lie not in transmitting subject matter *per se*, as at present, but rather in the artful and adequate introduction to fields of knowledge and the laying upon them of a perspective useful throughout the life span. Through such perspectives—knowledge *about* knowledge, as it were—the individual's judgment concerning what knowledge were necessary in succeeding problems, and how to acquire such knowledge as were immediately and temporarily essential would be facilitated.

Accordingly, electives from the usual array of courses would be eliminated in general education, in the interest of pursuing in the manner indicated *all* major fields of knowledge. In practical application, the gifted youth would, instead of selecting Biology, *or* Chemistry, *or* Physics, *or* Geology would be required to understand the nature of all these disciplines at the level, not of existing fact destined so rapidly to become outmoded, but in terms of inherent characteristics of the fields themselves. And his tedious, utterly laborious pursuit of a single foreign language through the artificial instruction of artifically learned teachers would give way to equivalent time in the study of linguistic phenomena, so as to bring within reach of individual mastery the particular forms and uses of any language across the face of the universe, when the exigencies of adult responsibility and opportunity might so indicate.

Now, the full application of this principle, again, bespeaks a very radical departure from pedagogical conceptions as they are, the distinctiveness of the capacity level of the superior learner and his anticipated roles on the frontiers of culture indicating the changed procedure. This form of "preparation for life" is both as possible and as pertinent for the gifted, as it is impracticable and unrealistic in the education of the generality.

The *third* and final reversal in experiential ratio which we submit as appropriate for the gifted concerns *the degree of abstraction involved in the instructional process*. The role of direct experience is well recognized in modern educational practices in general. The sand table, the field trip, the school laboratory all testify to an imbedded respect for the inductive mode. "Learning by doing" is truly a foundation stone for modern school instruction.

However, the necessary ratio of concrete experience to the intellective ramification of that experience in the development of generalizations is a variable factor in learning. A rough negative correlation is indicated between the intelligence of the individual and the amount of concrete experience essential to the

understanding of a concept. Therefore, it is suggested that at all points in the educative process where the concrete can be abbreviated for gifted youth, in recognition of its diminished necessity, that this be accomplished.

The presentation of curricular material in text and in lecture should be couched at a level of generalization that recognizes the amount of direct experience that the gifted individual will have undergone in formal school and informal environment, and tend to bring to the learning situation. Textbooks written at advanced levels, encyclopedic articles on specific problems (these being noted for compactness and comprehensiveness), and original writings by critics, historians, and scientists on the level of the academic and professional world, as distinct from the standard textual presentation—all these are indicated as more likely to approximate a convenient ratio between the concrete and the abstract than does the text and lesson presentation, at normal grade levels, through which the generality are schooled.

In the education of the gifted, we further note that "ideas" should receive central emphasis. Instruction in ideas as such, and in their relative magnitudes; and curricular traffic in literature conceived at generic levels of ideational structure —these are the zestful educational ingredients for able youngsters. Thus the *idea* of psychological measurement is likely to be attractive, in addition to the study and application of instruments of measurement; the *idea* of electricity as a controlled natural energy, in addition to the mechanics of control; the *idea* of social security, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Such ideas exist in every subject area. They are found in the history of the subject, from which history "creative moments" may be selected for particular examination. The isolation of "great experiments" in Psychology or in Physics contains the same potentiality. Reflection upon major and minor discoveries in the development of man's complex technology, upon "accidents that have influenced history," are further indications of the educational potential in the selection for study of ideas *per se*.

It follows finally that the re-presentation of knowledge acquired by the gifted youth should take the more general and the more abstract form. Expectations by the teacher that classroom contributions and individual reports reflect the higher intellectual process are appropriate; merely average quality in thought and performance are not appropriate, and should not be acceptable. In like fashion, teacher-made tests should contain exercises which tap the superiority of the gifted through discussions which demand greater precision in significant fact, more elaborate cognizance of the related variables in a problem, more penetrating inference beyond fact, and more responsible judgment. Without such advanced expectations at all levels in the educative process, the education of the gifted falls short of evoking his finest potential, and school experiences, rather, conduce toward his mediocrity.

CONCLUSION

Now, what have we been saying? A regrettable dichotomy between the empirical and the rational in American culture and science, appears to have manifestations in the field of special education for the gifted. The greatest theoretical vacua appear to be in the areas of programming the special provisions, and in

curricular theory. The special curricula being devised so numerously across the nation are far too inadequately buttressed and disciplined by a clear logic, and far too largely the result of spontaneous, unsystematic thought, and immediate exigencies. An intermediate body of principles standing between psychological and sociological fact on the one hand, and school programs on the other—a differential theory of experience to guide the establishment of school practices—may have been the major default of the educator. This presentation comprises certain of the author's attempts at this type of essentially rational endeavor.

BUSINESS CIVILIZATION AND THE FAMILY

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> cross-purposes to each other, must somehow be composed if either of them is to reach any important conclusion. And the family is the place where the most immediate conflicts among such institutional tendencies must be resolved.[27]

A civilization, then, has two interrelated responsibilities with respect to family life: 1) to be the "good provider" in the sense that the institutional complex is so ordered as to have accessible to the family all the natural-cultural materials which the family's purposes require; and 2) to develop and refine the intelligence of all members of society to enable them to "choose the better from the worse cause," i.e., incorporate a sound system of values so that they can effectively mediate the institutional complex in the rearing of children. Our thesis is that to the extent that business is dominant, its "civilization" fails both responsibilities.

To be continued in the October 1960 issue.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 282–283.

SOME DESIRABLE EMPHASES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION[1]

BY DEAN HUAI CHIN SUN

AT THE OUTSET LET ME DEFINE THE TERM "PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION" WHICH APPEARS IN THE TITLE OF THIS PAPER. I shall use this phrase simply and plainly to refer to one of the professional courses offered in American teacher-training institutions; most of us in this Society—perhaps all—have been teaching it in colleges or universities. It is included in the total teacher-education curriculum at either the undergraduate or graduate level for young candidates who intend to become either elementary or secondary school teachers. The philosophy of education may indeed be studied as a purely intellectual discipline in the search for a liberal education, for pleasure, or what not. This use of the phrase will not be included in the scope of my paper. Furthermore, no reference is intended to the advanced courses in the field designed for doctoral candidates who are primarily interested in preparing themselves for college teaching.

Having thus delimited the use of the term "philosophy of education," I shall proceed to present to you what I believe should be the new emphases in the reorganization of materials and methods in the course entitled philosophy of education.

In the first place, there is a need for well-balanced content and methods in the philosophy of education. One of the trends in the study of the philosophy of education, as pointed out by Frank Wegener[2] in his "*Guide for Students in History and Philosophy of Education*," is that the content of general philosophy appears to be playing a bigger part in educational thought today. Among the commonly used textbooks in the field, Butler's *Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and Religion* is representative of the trend. That the course is organized around the traditional systematic patterns of philosophy is characteristic of the trend.

It is a generally accepted fact that only a few higher institutions in the nation offer a semester course in the philosophy of education at the undergraduate level, and most of the teacher-training institutions ignore it entirely.[3] Except in a doctoral program in the field (or in Foundations of Education) which is designed, I believe, to prepare college professors of education, the one-semester or two-semester course in the field either at the undergraduate or graduate level is designed to assist the prospective elementary and secondary school teachers to achieve "a thoughtful approach to the problems of education."

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[1]This paper is a revision of one read at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Philosophy of Education Society, at Dallas, November, 1957.

[2]Frank C. Wegener, *Guide for Students in History and Philosophy of Education* (Dubuque: William C. Brown Co., 1953). p. 7.

[3]George Z. F. Bereday and Joseph A. Lauwerys, editors, *Education and Philosophy* (Yearbook of Education, 1957, Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Co., 1957), pp. 523–525.

The new trend introduced a change in the organization of the philosophy of education. The course organized around the traditional systems of technical philosophy gives profuse treatment of the problems in metaphysics and epistemology, while an intelligent consideration of the educational problems of today is dealt with meagerly and inadequately. Each problem is considered as an opportunity to affix philosophical labels. The issues and problems in education and the most concrete expression of them, however, do not follow the patterns imposed by such traditional systems of ideas. To cast the pupils, teachers, parents, administrators, or communities in a cut and dried mold of "Idealism," "Realism," or "Pragmatism,"[4] for instance, is farcical, for it assumes situations that do not exist.

On the outcomes of the new trend in the organizing and teaching of the philosophy of education, Professor Sininger of New Mexico Highlands University[5] commented: "Some verbalizing on the part of students is the most that can be accomplished." Professor Axtelle of New York University[6] struck a similar note when he remarked that the courses in the philosophy of education as offered today "serve little purpose in education beyond that of providing suitable terms for incantation rites." Apparently two considerations have been overlooked in connection with the new trend. First, while it may be true that a very limited number of students may take the philosophy of education for liberal education, it is an undeniable fact that the course is designed as a integral part of the teacher-education program and taken primarily by the prospective teachers who will follow teaching as a life career in the public schools. Second, the philosophy of education, as the philosophy of history, the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of other disciplines, is an applied philosophy. Its chief and only fiunction is the application of philosophical inquiry to the conduct of the education of today, which is a very practical undertaking.

The content of the course in the philosophy of education must be so organized as to perform its dual function, namely, "continued philosophical self-evaluation" and "the continued regard for the work of the teacher and its relation to the life of the nation."[7] Professor Ulich has well stated the unique nature of the course in the following remarks:[8]

> "Only when practical interests respect the speculative, and the speculative serve the practical, can humanity and its cultural endeavors thrive. And it is exactly philosophy of education which should best be able to bind the thinker and the doer into a covenant of mutual responsibility."

There is a real danger that the philosophy of education is becoming more and more speculative, divorced from the practical interests of the schools. Unless the course is tied up with the conduct of the practical affairs of the schools, fewer and

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[4]Rupert C. Lodge, *Philosophy of Education.* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947).

[5]Harlan Sininger's letter written to the author on April 19, 1955.

[6]George E. Axtelle, "Philosophy in American Education," *Harvard Educational Review* XXVI (Spring, 1956), p. 185.

[7]Robert Ulich, "Sometimes One Wonders . . ." *Harvard Educational Review* XXVI (Spring, 1956), p. 174.

[8]*Loc. cit.*

fewer educational administrators will find any significant role for the course in the professional training of teachers.

In the second place, there is a need for giving a proper role to the theory of social values. In drawing upon the work of the academic philosophers for the philosophy of education, attention has been focused upon the materials and methods in metaphysics and epistemology. A scrutiny of the content of some popular textbooks in the field bears out this observation. Again, it seems to me, the trend should be subjected to critical examination, in order to ascertain if it is a sound and wholesome one.

It is difficult to see what significant difference all the metaphysical distinctions would make in regard to practical educational problems, though it is admitted that some metaphysical beliefs may entail some educational corollaries. Even in the formulation of objectives in education, which is generally recognized as the area where philosophy can contribute the most, the value impact of metaphysics and epistemology as claimed by some educational philosophers can hardly be substantiated. "What is the Ultimate Real?" "Is the universe physical, mechanical or spiritual?" To what extent, do the answers to these questions affect the educational aims, such as citizenship, cooperation, sense of responsibility, vocational competency, worthy home membership, use of leisure time—to mention only a few of the commonly accepted objectives? On the other hand, none of these aims can be logically independent of a theory of social value.

The notion that the resolution of educational problems depends upon one's theory of reality is largely academic. This notion seems to suggest that we cannot as educators achieve a sensible agreement about the management of school affairs unless we agree about the "Ultimate Being." Professor Hook[9] pointed out the fallacy of this notion most tersely:

> If that (the notion) were true, then since there is no likelihood that we will agree about theories of reality, our prospects of ever agreeing about educational matters would be remote, indeed. Nonetheless there are many educational questions on which substantial agreement has been reached . . .

He further argued:

> If our values depend upon our mataphysics or theologies, we should be at one another's throats all the time. . . . I can't see what differential bearing statements like "Being is One" or "Being is Many" or "God Created the World," or their denials, have on such statements as "Sharing is better than stealing," or Actions performed voluntarily are nobler than those done under compulsion."[10]

What is true of "the metaphysics of education," is true also of "the epistemology of education." Is our knowledge as to how to learn and teach actually derived from epistemology? Will epistemology introduce any significant changes in our classroom instructions? The remark made by Dewey that the advance of science made the problem of knowledge a remote philosophical concern has

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[9]Sidney Hook, "The Scope of Philosophy of Education," *Harvard Educational Review* XXVI (Spring, 1956), p. 145.

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 146.

become increasingly true.[11] Think for a moment, for instance, of the progress made in reading techniques through the advance in science and technology. The description of the process of how we come to know falls into the domain of psychology. As a matter of fact, epistemology offers only the criteria of the knowledge learned; it provides no actual path of obtaining knowledge. The way to learn and to teach is best derived empirically. Hook[12] categorically stated that "No one ever derived a single item of new knowledge about learning either from epistemology or epistemology of education."

Furthermore, in epistemology, is Kant, for instance, the proponent of the theory of presentation or representation? On this our philosophers disagree. To be sure of success in confusing the poor prospective teachers, the philosophers (general or educational) designate Plato's thought as "realist" idealism, since the basic elements in his system possess an extra-mental status, although whether the nature of that extra-mental element is spiritual, material, or merely logical is still unknown to our philosophers.

Education is immersed in values. "It is always governed by norms, deriving their own meaning from values inherent in the life of people organized in cultures."[13] The social conditions, problems and needs of the economic, moral, religious, political and other institutions of our times inevitably and potently affect our teaching or learning about values. It is apparent that the philosophy of education should be primarily concerned with questions of value, with issues of ethics and social philosophy. The deeply normative character of education is, however, largely ignored in the philosophy of education, because the philosophers are too busily occupied with problems of Ultimate Reality, Being, and Non-Being. The philosophy of education should be concerned first and last with the classification of the social values so that the prospective teachers will be prepared to help the children of the nation learn how to live up to the norms of the culture. The only way to teach social values is to confront them directly, and not to retreat from human issues and problems to the more technical concerns of academic philosophy. "The task of future philosophy," Durant[14] reminded his readers in his popular book, *The Story of Philosophy*, "is to clarify men's ideas as to social and moral strifes of their own day." Plato, for instance, wrote his *Republic* in response to the unstable social conditions of his day. Without serious effort to deal with social conflicts and issues, it is difficult to conceive of citizenship[15] as a dominating aim of education.

Dewey's[16] comments on the state of philosophy made in 1946 are surprisingly

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[11]John Dewey, *Problems of Men*. (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 7.

[12]Hook, *Op. cit.*, p. 148.

[13]Theodore Brameld, *Cultural Foundations of Education* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 13.

[14]Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1927), p. 395.

[15]Included in both the Seven Cardinal Principles and the four objectives of the Educational Policies Commission as well as in most of the important statements of educational aims, ancient and modern.

[16]Dewey, *Op. cit.*, pp. 3–20.

applicable to the state of the philosophy of education of today. The philosophy of education is preoccupying itself overmuch with the knowledge of Being and Reality. The more this emphasis prevails, the more it becomes entangled with a task that is no longer humanly or socially significant. Its content has become increasingly technical and out of touch with the problems and issues of actual school life. In a time as troubled as the present when the problems of social values and moral issues have become so important, the philosophy of education has relegated them to a place that is subordinate to the theories of reality and knowledge. The net result of this neglect of issues that are urgent, and of preoccupation with issues that are remote from active social concerns and school life explains the popular discredit into which the course, philosophy of education, has progressively fallen.

It is interesting to note that Kandel, a strong critic of the experimentalist philosophy of education, agreed with Dewey on the shortcomings of the metaphysics—epistemology approach in the philosophy of education when he stated:

> They admit that educational administrators do not appear to have any use for philosophy of education. The reason may be found in the failure of such philosophy to consider those aspects of education which the administrators must take into account. They are concerned with relations of the school to the public that supports it, of the school to society, of education to political theory in general, as well as with the details of educational administration and organization—the cost of education or even school buildings may be affected by certain philosophical points of view. Accordingly the study of political and social philosophy cannot be evaded, for political and social ends are among the strongest determinants of education, particularly at a time when the war of ideas and ideologies is being waged everywhere, and the influence of aggressive nationalism is stronger today than ever. It is precisely because these determining forces have been neglected in the study of educational philosophy that public education has encountered many of its recent difficulties and that so many conflicts have arisen on academic freedom, controversial issues, and social change through education.[17]

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to discuss any problem of great magnitude, national or international, without a conception of values involved. The cold war, tensions and distrust among the world powers on the international scene, the civil rights issue, states' rights, book-burning, loyalty oaths of various kinds, integration of public schools, controversy over teaching about UN and UNESCO in schools, to mention only a few out of the long list of current issues of the national scene, are nothing but an eloquent indication of a dire need to emphasize value theory in the philosophy of education. Just a few years ago, the term "atomic age" appeared in current literature; a little later, the "age of automation." Before people could have time to comprehend the meanings of the terms, Sputnik I and II have ushered in the "satellite age." With the fast shrinking of the globe and the increasingly interweaving of national with international complexities, it is exceedingly difficult to overemphasize the role of a theory of values in the philosophy of education.

However, it may not be difficult to understand why many of our philosophers choose to minimize the function of the social value theory in the philosophy of education, if we recall the topic of Robert M. Hutchins' commencement address

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[17] I. L. Kandel, "Philosophy of Education," *Harvard Educational Review* XXVI (Spring, 1956), p. 135.

delivered in Hunter College last summer, "It is not safe to think"[18]—particularly to think about the social issues. It is reported that the General Electric Company training manual for managers instructs the industrial magnates that they are never to say anything controversial.[19] It is dangerous to each about UN, UNESCO, or labor movements in the classroom, but it is safe to discuss the "Ideas" and "Forms" of Plato and Aristotle. "They (university professors) are not shy about attacking what seems to them to be educational abuses and shortcomings. Their avidity for argument does not seem to extend to the controversial area of school segregation."[20] It is felt that when philosophy has ceased to have anything to say, or fears to have anything to say, it turns inward upon itself.[21] Even Billy Graham, the world-renowned evangelist, as pointed out by Reinhold Niebuhr, "neglected to explore the social dimensions of the Gospel. Though he has sound personal views on racial segregation and other social issues of our times, he almost ignores all of them in his actual preaching."[22] It was Dewey who defended Bertrand Russell when he was dismissed under outside pressures from the City College of New York, and Hutchins who defended the University of California faculty who were fired because of their refusal to sign the Regents' Loyalty Oath.

In the third place, there is a need for a synthesis of the leading educational philosophies. The synthetic approach in the philosophy of education, it seems to me, is a sound and necessary one. Some advance has been made along this line, and more sincere and serious efforts should be made. The National Society for the Study of Education made a good start in this direction in 1942, and a similar endeavor is made in its recent fifty-fourth yearbook.

No one philosopher or one philosophy has ever alone grasped the truth. It seems doubtful that this will ever happen in the future. Too frequently the advocate of a new system for replacement of the old ones, like the blind man in the well-known anecdote, has hold of only the elephant's trunk or tail. It seems paradoxical but true that the weakness of a system is inherently rooted in its strength, for any leading philosophy is developed out of its social milieu, and whenever there is a change in the social demands, the philosophy should be re-evaluated accordingly.

It is necessary to recognize the common ground among all the competing systems. The similarities should be magnified, not the minor, trivial differences. All schools of educational philosophy, (so far as the course "philosophy of education" in a teacher-training program is concerned) have a common goal to strive for, that is, the training of competent teachers for the nation's schools through a "thoughtful approach to school problems." The philosophers have a common front at a higher level or in terms of a larger scene, which is the search for wisdom for the betterment of man and society, whereas the educational philosophers working within the total program of teacher education and the framework of the

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[18]*The Sunday Denver Post*, July 14, 1957.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 3.

[20]William W. Brickman, "Silence and Segregation," *School and Society*, 85: 360, November, 1957.

[21]Lewis S. Fever, "The Aims of Philosophy of Education," *Harvard Educational Review* XXVI (Spring, 1956), p. 113.

[22]*Life*, July 1, 1957, p. 92.

American public education system have, in addition, a specific common undertaking.

It is quite likely that, if we begin with or concentrate on metaphysical and epistemological problems, there will be more reason to believe that we shall be at odds with each other. However, our differences can be considerably and significantly reduced if we begin our inquiry with our school children in the classrooms of present-day America. As a matter of fact, there are many educational problems on which substantial agreement has been reached. This is no surprise at all, since "as far as theory goes there are surprisingly few discords."[23] The similarity in school management and practice over the United States as a whole is surprisingly greater than anticipated by a visitor from abroad in view of the fact that there is no federal control of education. After all, the school children, the community resources, and the social conditions under which the schools operate are all too real. No genuine philosophizing can ignore these irreducible and stubborn facts.

On the other hand, democracy as the nation's ideal has been generally accepted as the guiding principle in designing the nation's school program. With democracy as a frame of reference, the social milieu as the common background, and the school population and communities as resources to work with, one sometimes wonders how the educational philosophers can be so far apart from each other as they appear to be in talks and writings in their attack upon real school problems. It is no wonder that, after a study of the statements representing three conflicting philosophies including Instrumentalism, Humanism, and Thomism, Rhinelander of Havard University concluded:

> There is so little disagreement among the several statements that I am at a loss to find a substantial issue for comment or rejoinder. This leads me to wonder whether the distinction between the "Instrumentalist", the "Neo-Humanist", and the "Rationalist" theories of general education are as clear cut or significant as may have been supposed, or whether we may not be dealing with a set of desceptively pretentious labels which suggest wider differences than actually exist."[24]

To conclude, the philosophy of education, if it is to play an important role in professional training, must give due emphasis to some essential aspects which have been largely ignored. The philosophy of education has to be concerned with the actual conduct of school affairs. The students taking the course have to be prepared to face and accept the issues and challenges of their times in terms of the social value theories. A synthesis of the educational philosophies is needed in order to make possible a comprehensive approach, which will, in turn, end the time-worn, garrulous wrangle over the insignificant differences and, to quote from Professor Ulich again, the "theoretical inbreeding and futility." Kandel has well concluded in his article:

> Above all it is important to bear in mind that a philosophy of education, if it is to serve the education profession, can neither be speculative nor wedded to one source from which all its wisdom is professedly derived.[25]

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[23]P. H. Rhinelander, "A Symposium on Conflicting Philosophies of General Education," *College and University Bulletin*, November 1, 1954.

[24]*Loc. cit.*

[25]I. L. Kandel, *Op. cit.*, p. 136.

IS A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION POSSIBLE?

BY HOWARD A. OZMON, JR.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION DEPENDS IMPORTANTLY UPON WHAT WE MEAN BY SCIENCE. If we interpret science to mean a narrow set of disciplines in which exact results can always be determined, then obviously there can be no science of education. However, such a conception would limit most of the sciences as we know them, especially the social sciences. Obviously, we must be considerably broader in our definition.

The scientific method does not necessarily involve laboratory procedure, but may simply be a means of looking at things critically. If we accept this premise, as offered by Huxley and Darwin, then clearly, science should have a lot to do with education.

In the Middle Ages, the philosophers were the ones who solved our educational dilemmas. But the best representative of our twentieth-century culture is no longer the philsopher, but the scientist. To ignore, therefore, whatever import science can have for education, is to turn our backs upon the most significant, vital, and adventurous thinking of our age.

Science has no quarrel with philosophy, nor vice-versa, when the issues are clearly defined. Though John Dewey objected strenuously to the way in which scientific techniques were often misused in education, yet he did not object to the scientific search for new methods, nor to their reasonable employment.

Science is far from being a panacea for educational difficulties, but unfortunately, it is neglected altogether, in favor of the philosophic approach. Science recognizes and appreciates the philosophical approach, but reacts against the often less than equal status often afforded it in seeking an answer to basic educational difficulties.

When once it is conceded that science has a qualitative as well as a quantitative role to play in life, then shall we begin to see that science has a close affinity with education. Science affects education both as a whole, and in part. As a whole, it coordinates, and gives a fresh perspective to many old and troublesome problems, such as, "how do people learn?", and "what change does learning affect?". In part, it can contribute to various curriculum areas. In 1899, the policy was, "learn-by-heart-and-recite-by-rote". But the psychology of James, and the adjustment techniques, changed our entire conception of that method, and influenced our philosophical conceptions accordingly.

Education cannot afford to neglect the important contributions which science has to offer, particularly in the fields of psychology and the social sciences, as well as in biology, chemistry, cybernetics, and other fields. To dismiss such knowledge as unrelated to education, simply because it is traditional to do so, is to neglect new and vital areas of information which can serve us constructively.

To have a deep and abiding interest in twentieth-century education, is to have at least a partial understanding of the role which science can play in its behalf.

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